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An understanding of ownership is an important aspect of child development 
because it helps to promote harmonious social interactions. People are typically restricted 
from using objects belonging to others. Respecting others‘ ownership rights is necessary 
for socially appropriate behaviour. Because of the frequent property disputes that children 
engage in, it might be expected that preschoolers‘ appreciation for ownership is limited   
and that adult input is needed to teach children about ownership rights. In three 
experiments, I demonstrate the opposite. Preschoolers value ownership rights more 
strongly than do adults and support ownership rights in property entitlement disputes 
between a possessor and an owner. An additional two experiments demonstrate that 
although children strongly value ownership rights above other principles of entitlement, 
they show some flexibility in their reasoning about ownership rights when provided with 
sufficiently compelling reasons to consider disregarding these rights.  
These findings show developmental differences in children‘s ability to determine 
when ownership rights should be disregarded. Older children and adults disregard 
ownership rights when they are provided with compelling enough reasons do so, whereas 
younger children often uphold owners‘ rights to the exclusion of all other factors. 
Together, these studies challenge the intuitive view that children learn about ownership 
from adult input. Rather than strengthening children‘s appreciation of ownership rights, 
adult input may serve to teach children about situations where it is socially appropriate to 
disregard ownership.  
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Chapter One:  Introduction and Literature Review 
 
 
Ownership has important consequences for everyone. First, ownership (and the 
rules surrounding ownership) protects our possessions. Without ownership, our household 
items, our cars, and even our homes could be confiscated by anyone who desired them.  
Second, ownership helps to determine our behaviour toward objects. It is necessary to 
have an understanding of ownership before deciding how to behave toward an object in 
various situations. Suppose Sue writes in a stranger‘s notebook without asking permission. 
This action could very easily result in a heated argument. However, suppose Sue writes in 
her friend Jimmy‘s notebook without asking permission. In this case, rather than being 
upset at Sue, Jimmy might actually be interested in what Sue was writing. Thus, the same 
behavior may be acceptable in one situation but not in another, depending on the owner of 
the object and the relation between the individuals involved. Third, understanding 
ownership is necessary for normal social functioning. Failure to recognize the intricacies 
of ownership inevitably results in conflicts that seriously impede an individual‘s ability to 
function socially. 
Privileges Associated with Ownership 
Ownership implies not only that owners have certain rights to what they own, but 
also that these rights are unique to the owners; they are not shared with others (Cohen, 
1954; Merrill, 1998; Snare, 1972). The philosopher Frank Snare outlined three rules of 
ownership. First, owners have the right of use. In the example above, this right entitles 
only Jimmy to use his notebook whenever he likes because he is the owner of the 
notebook. Second, owners have the right of exclusion. This right implies that non-owners 




are excluded from using the object unless they are given permission by the owner. Thus, 
the owner decides who can and cannot use his property. If Sue is a friend, then perhaps 
Jimmy would allow her to use the notebook, but he may decide to exclude non-friends. 
Third, owners have the right of transfer. This right implies that Jimmy can transfer 
ownership of his notebook to Sue or whoever else he wants to own it. If ownership is 
transferred to Sue, she will gain all of the ownership rights associated with the notebook, 
including the right to transfer the notebook to another person. Jimmy will no longer have 
any more rights associated with the notebook than any other non-owner.  
Ownership Disputes in Early Childhood 
Ownership and related ideas are central to children‘s property disputes. Object 
disputes are the earliest, most frequent, and most intense interpersonal conflicts among 
young children (Ross & Conant, 1992). On average, young children are involved in 
disputes with their peers more than nine times per hour and the largest percentage of 
toddler and preschool disputes involve the possession and use of objects (Brenner & 
Mueller, 1982; Hay, 1984; Shantz, 1987). Object exchange and object possession 
disagreements are the most frequent occurrences in shared meaning interactions (social 
interactions with a shared theme) among two-year-old children (Brenner & Mueller, 
1982). The most frequent conflicts for 2- to 5-year-olds involve disputes over the use and 
possession of objects (Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981).  
An understanding of ownership is therefore an important aspect of child 
development because it helps to promote harmonious social interactions. Suppose that 
Billy owns a ball. If Sally does not understand the concept of ownership, then she will not 
be aware that as a non-owner she has an obligation to ask Billy for permission to use his 




ball. Without this understanding, Sally might take the ball without asking for permission, 
which will likely lead to an argument with Billy. The argument may be difficult to resolve 
because both children may feel that they have a right to use the ball. If Sally grasps the 
concept of ownership, she may still choose to take Billy‘s ball without asking, but she will 
likely be aware of her misdeed and will probably not fight as relentlessly to keep 
possession of the ball. Ownership is important because we want to maintain the objects 
that belong to us and also minimize conflict with others.   
Understanding Ownership in Early Childhood 
  Why might young children have frequent property disputes? An intuitive answer 
might be because they know very little about ownership. One might assume that children 
find themselves in these disputes because they have no understanding of what it means to 
own something and what it means not to own something. As a result, they frequently 
violate owners‘ rights and become involved in recurrent property disputes.  
 Several studies have investigated children‘s understanding of what it means to own 
something. These studies do support the view that young children have a limited 
understanding of ownership and of the rights associated with ownership. A study 
investigating children‘s ability to reason about the ownership of large scale items (such as 
public buses and public schools), found that younger children (5- to 6-years-old) lacked a 
mature understanding of ownership of public property until at least 8- to 9-years-old 
(Cram  & Ng,1994). Similarly, a study investigating children‘s ability to infer who owns 
items such as local factories, public transportation, and farmland, found that the youngest 
children performed poorly, often attributing ownership to the person with the closest 
physical contact (i.e., the worker owns the factory) (Berti, Bombi, & Lis, 1982). And 




another study investigating children‘s reasoning about legitimate (e.g., purchasing) and 
illegitimate (e.g., stealing) bases of ownership found that the youngest children did not 
have an accurate understanding of what made someone an owner or what rights were 
associated with ownership (Cram & Ng, 1988). Furthermore, when children aged four 
years and older rated the badness of characters who refused to give an object back to its 
previous owner, children 4- to 6-years old failed to understand that refusing to return an 
object to its owner is worse if the object was acquired by theft than by gift. The findings 
were interpreted as showing that young children understand ―own‖ in the same way that 
adults understand ―on loan‖ (Hook, 1993).  
Young children have also shown difficulty understanding when ownership can be 
permanently transferred. A study investigating children‘s knowledge of ownership 
transfers found that young children have problems discriminating between legitimate 
transfers such as gift-giving and illegitimate transfers such as stealing. The authors 
claimed that children do not have a mature understanding of such ownership transfers 
until at least age five (Blake & Harris, 2009). However, even younger children were more 
successful at recognizing a transfer of ownership when it occurred during highly ritualized 
contexts such as when ownership was being transferred by giving a wrapped gift for a 
birthday present (Blake & Harris, 2009; Friedman & Neary, 2008). 
 Despite the studies suggesting that young children do not have a mature 
understanding of ownership, I think that these studies underestimate children‘s abilities. 
Several of the mentioned studies involved children reasoning about ownership of large-
scale items (Berti, Bombi, & Lis, 1982; Cram  & Ng,1994). The difficulty children had 
with reasoning about ownership may have occurred because children were simply 




unfamiliar with who the actual owners of these items are. Similarly, when children had 
difficulty reasoning about what rights were associated with ownership, they were asked to 
judge stories about children‘s interactions with a shopkeeper. The responses in this study 
may have underestimated children‘s understanding of ownership rights simply because 
children only have experience buying items from shopkeepers and may have had difficulty 
reasoning about exchanges with a shopkeeper that involved unusual situations that are 
unlikely to occur within a shop setting (i.e., gift-giving) (Cram  & Ng, 1989). 
 It also seems unlikely that children have no understanding of ownership for two 
additional reasons. First, imagine a world in which young children know nothing of 
ownership. If young Bobby were given a toy car, he would be unlikely to maintain 
possession of it for very long. He would be unaware that he could use the car whenever he 
wanted, and he would not realize that he had the right to exclude others from taking it. 
Other children, also unaware of ownership, would attempt to use his car, and neither the 
owner nor the non-owner would know how to resolve any conflict that arose. It would be 
difficult to determine whether the first child who was given the object should be awarded 
the object or whether the second child should get it. Without a general understanding of 
ownership, children would have no concept of entitlement. To resolve this conflict using 
the rules of ownership, Bobby would need instruction on what it means to be the owner of 
an object. He would also need to learn that, as an owner, he has the right to maintain 
possession of his object and to exclude others from his property.  
In reality, children rarely seem to need such instruction. Instead, children seem 
acutely aware of and possessive of what they own, such that parents often feel it necessary 
to intervene during property disputes, encouraging their children to share or to find 




something else to play with (Ross, 1996; Ross, Telsa, Kenyon, & Lollis, 1990). One might 
think that teaching children to share or to find something else to play with should actually 
provide them with a sense that, as an owner, they do not have any rights (they do not have 
the right to exclude if they are always told to share the object). It seems likely, then, that 
young children do have some understanding about ownership and that parents do not need 
to instruct them on what it means to be the owner of an object. 
Second, other studies have demonstrated that children reason about ownership 
from a young age. Very young children can determine who owns an object even if the 
owner is not physically in possession of an object. In fact, 2-year-olds (and even some 
children as young as 18 months) are able to differentiate between their own possessions 
and their mother‘s possessions when reasoning about objects with which they are 
personally acquainted (e.g., toothbrushes, books, and shoes) (Fasig, 2000). Two-year-olds 
are even able to determine who owns unfamiliar objects. One way that they do this is by 
assuming that the first person to possess an object is its owner. In one series of 
experiments (Friedman & Neary, 2008), 2-year-olds were shown scenarios where one 
child possesses an object and then another child immediately possesses this same object. 
In such scenarios, children report that the first person to possess the object is the owner. 
This is the same pattern of results demonstrated by adult participants in a similar study, 
showing that there is remarkable consistency between children‘s early understanding of 
how ownership is inferred from first possession and the heuristic that they will later use as 
adults (Friedman, 2008). And beginning at age three, young children judge that a person 
who creates an object (or creatively modifies it) is that objects owner (Kanngiesser, 
Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010). 




Young children can also observe someone controlling permission over an object 
and can infer that the person exerting this type of control is likely the object‘s owners 
(Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009). Children 3- to 5-years old were shown scenarios 
where one character asks the other character to play with a toy. The second character 
either grants or denies permission to play with the object. Children as young as 3 ½ 
inferred that the character who is either granting or denying access to the object is likely 
that object‘s owner when the character actually controlled access to the object (i.e., the 
first character cannot play with it because the second character will not let them). 
However, children did not make this inference when the character was preventing access 
to the object because of some situation out of their control (i.e., the first character cannot 
play with it because it is dinner time right now).  
Young children not only know how to infer ownership, they also seem to have 
some understanding of what it means to be the owner of an object. Eisenberg-Berg, 
Haake, Hand, and  Sadalla (1979) told 2-year-olds that an item belonged either to them or 
to the school. Two-year-olds were more likely to stop other children from taking 
possession of a toy when they were told that the toy belonged to them and they could take 
it home, but not when they were told that the toy belonged to the school (see also 
Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, & Bartlett, 1981). Thus, it appears that children do understand 
Snare‘s (1972) rule of exclusion. However, there is an alternative possibility. Perhaps 
when children were told that they were the owners and could take the object home with 
them, they became more attached to the object and simply became more determined to 
keep the object in their possession. This determination to keep the object with them may 
have caused them to fight more adamantly and to be more persistent in their stance. This 




may have then helped them to resist the takeover attempts from others. However, a more 
recent study using a third-person methodology not open to such alternative explanations, 
has found that children aged four and five often uphold an owners‘ rights, although they 
do so less often than adults (Kim & Kalish, 2009).   
The Developmental Question 
Ownership is invisible and abstract. When you look at an object you cannot see 
whether or not someone owns the object, you cannot see who owns the object, and you 
cannot see what rights and privileges are associated with owning the object. As previously 
mentioned, the Friedman and Neary (2008) and Neary, Friedman, and Burnstein (2009) 
studies provide evidence that children can make accurate inferences about the ownership 
of objects, suggesting that they do have a concept of ownership. But how is it that children 
come to learn about the rights associated with ownership? The most obvious source of 
ownership information is parental input. Presumably, when a child is involved in a 
property dispute with another child, parents intervene and teach the children how to settle 
the dispute by outlining the rules and expectations for the particular situation. Parents 
respond to children‘s transgressions and disputes with reasons for these rules and 
expectations. Given that property disputes are the most common type of conflict among 
young children (Ross & Conant, 1992), and because children are so emotionally invested 
in these disputes, it seems likely that this would be an ideal time for parents to teach 
children the proper rules of ownership. If children acquire their understanding of 
ownership directly from parental input, then children‘s ownership reasoning during 
property disputes should mirror that of their parents. However, this certainly is not always 
the case.  




Ross (1996) compared parents‘ and siblings‘ (aged 2- and 4-years-old) principles 
of entitlement during property disputes. The siblings were observed during free play and 
details on property conflicts were recorded. Specifically, the type of conflict, the 
children‘s reasoning as to why they should get to use the object, the eventual outcome of 
the dispute, whether parental intervention occurred, and the parent‘s entitlement 
arguments were all recorded and analyzed.   
The siblings were involved in many different types of property disputes. Most 
arguments centered on possession and ownership disputes. In some disputes, one child 
possessed an object (i.e., was holding it or playing with it) and the other child wanted it, 
but neither child specifically owned it. In another type of dispute, one child possessed and 
owned an object that another child wanted. In other disputes, a non-owner possessed a toy 
and wanted to continue using the toy at the same time that the owner of the object also 
wanted to use the toy. These types of property disputes are particularly interesting because 
they give insight into whether children and adults value possession or ownership more 
strongly when settling property disputes.  
Ross‘s study (1996) found that adults were inconsistent in the rights that they 
upheld, sometimes supporting ownership rights while other times supporting possession 
rights. When one child owned and possessed a toy that another child wanted, parents 
upheld ownership rights, judging that the child who currently possessed the object should 
continue to have the object. However, when a child was the owner of a toy that another 
child possessed, parents ignored ownership rights, judging that the child who currently 
possessed the object should continue to have the object. For instance, if Sue owned a toy 
train and Bobby was in possession of the train, parents almost always sided with Bobby. 




The experimenters also noted inconsistency in when parents chose to intervene in their 
child‘s property dispute; in some situations, parents would intervene, but they frequently 
would also choose not to intervene in the children‘s disputes and leave them to settle the 
disputes on their own.   
Interestingly, when parents did intervene and instructed their children on what they 
should do to settle the property dispute, parents frequently contradicted ownership 
principles by encouraging their children (both owner and non-owner) to avoid the conflict 
by finding something else to play with or by sharing the disputed object. The 
aforementioned right of use and right of exclusion rules of ownership dictate that an 
owner should have the right to use his object and to exclude others from using the object. 
Parents instructing owners to share their objects are, in a sense, teaching their children that 
owners do not have these rights. Constantly hearing that they should share their objects 
may teach children that they have the right to use their toys only so long as no one else is 
interested in playing with them. It is unlikely that parents are trying to oppose ownership 
rights when they tell their children to share. It is more likely that they are aware that their 
children have strong feelings of ownership and are trying to teach their children to share 
so as to foster more harmonious social interactions.  
 Additionally, Ross (1996) found that children have more consistent rules for 
settling property conflicts than do adults. Children aged two and four supported claims of 
ownership over claims of possession during most disputes. For instance, if Sue owned a 
toy train and Bobby was in possession of the train, Sue‘s rights were upheld during a 
property dispute. The rights of the owner were upheld regardless of whether the owner 
was in possession of the toy, and regardless of whether parents intervened. Children‘s 




support of owners‘ rights occurred in all types of property disputes. It is remarkable that 
children consistently upheld the rights of owners despite being provided with conflicting 
messages from parents. Thus, Ross‘s findings contradict the intuition that children learn 
how to settle property disputes through their parents. 
Why is there a difference between children‘s and adults‘ reasoning during property 
disputes?  One possibility is that children reason differently from adults because children 
value the owner‘s right to exclude so much that they are unable to see that sometimes 
there are situations that necessitate limiting the owner‘s right. Similarly, children may 
only be able to consider one factor at a time when making decisions; therefore, they focus 
only on the rights of owners and ignore all other factors relevant to the circumstance. 
Conceivably, adults are better able to consider multiple factors before reaching a decision. 
Perhaps adults do believe that the owner should have certain privileges associated with 
ownership, but they put more value on the other extenuating factors involved in the 
specific situations (factors such as who had the object first, who needs the object more, 
and even who will react more strongly to having the object removed). If we accept these 
possibilities, we may suppose that adults and children actually have similar ownership 
beliefs, but that they demonstrate their beliefs differently depending on the context of the 
situation, with adults paying more attention to context than children do.  
Alternatively, both the children‘s and adults‘ reasoning may differ depending on 
the position that they are in at the time of making the property allocation decision. When 
parents were intervening in the property disputes of their children, they did not have any 
personal desire to obtain the object in conflict. Therefore, one might suppose that parents 
were able to make property allocation decisions that reflect their true beliefs about 




ownership. However, parents may not be completely unbiased when making allocation 
decisions during property disputes that involve their children, because they may be 
strongly motivated to end the dispute and establish co-operation among their children. If 
this is the case, then when parents make their allocation decisions, they may instead focus 
on the easiest way to minimize and eliminate the conflict rather than considering only who 
owns the object. 
In Ross‘s (1996) study, children were involved in the property disputes as first 
party members. The owner‘s rights may have been upheld, not because the parties 
involved in the dispute understood ownership rights. Instead, the owner‘s rights may have 
been upheld because the owner‘s may have been more emotionally attached to the objects 
than the non-owners, and because they were more attached they may have been more 
motivated to fight for the objects. This motivation to fight may have allowed them to be 
more successful in the disputes. For example, if Tom and Sue are arguing over a crayon 
that Tom owns, Tom may fight harder to keep his object because he is the owner. Sue may 
relinquish the crayon, not because she knows that the crayon belongs to Tom, but because 
Tom is more determined to keep the crayon and is better at fighting to maintain his 
possession.  
To have a true understanding of how children and adults reason about ownership 
during property disputes, it is important to not just investigate how they would behave 
during actual disputes, but also to investigate how they would judge third party property 
disputes. Further studies should explore the difference between children‘s and adults‘ 
property entitlement reasoning in situations where they are not personally involved and 
therefore are less likely to have a vested interest in the outcome. 




Understanding the Rights of Owners 
 In summary, from a young age, children have a general idea about who may own 
objects within their environment. They also use a number of cues to determine who the 
owner of the object is (e.g., first possession and control of permission) if they do not 
initially know who the owner is. In addition, children appear to have some idea about 
what it means to own an object and tend to value the rights associated with ownership. 
However, this needs to be further explored in studies that remove children‘s own interests.  
Ownership Bias 
An additional interpretation that can be made from the  results of the Eisenberg-
Berg et al. (1979, 1981) and Ross (1996) studies is that children value the rights of owners 
so strongly that they are unable to consider any other factor when making allocation 
decisions during property disputes. This strong belief in owner‘s rights may cause children 
to evaluate a property dispute with an ―ownership bias‖. That is, children are biased to 
uphold and defend owners‘ rights to exclude and to use, and hence largely discount other 
factors. Such an ownership bias could be acquired very early in children‘s development 
and could be activated whenever children need to make a decision involving ownership. It 
may be only during subsequent development that children become more flexible in their 
reasoning and come to appreciate all of the situational factors that need to be considered 
before making a decision.  
  




Chapter Two: Thesis Rationale 
 
A great deal of what children learn stems from the teaching of their parents. 
Parents instruct their children on the names of different items (Gleason, 2005, pg 47-54), 
on how to behave socially (no hitting, no pulling hair, be nice to others) (Smetana, 1999), 
on how to colour, to complete a puzzle, to brush their teeth, and to use the bathroom, 
among a myriad of other situations. In all of these, parents teach their children through 
instruction and the children‘s behaviour matches parental expectations. For instance, 
parents may instruct their children that it is wrong to pull another child‘s hair, and (most 
of the time) children‘s behaviour demonstrates that they have accepted parental instruction 
and are behaving in accordance with their parent‘s expectations. However, in a key 
domain of social life, there appears to be an exception to this type of learning—gaining 
understanding of the concept of ownership.  
It is my belief that parents do not directly teach their children much about 
ownership. I suspect that parents rarely tell their children why someone is an owner of an 
object or how that person acquired ownership, yet children are able make inferences about 
ownership from a young age. Similarly, parents do not spend time teaching their children 
about what it means to be an owner. For instance, parents do not teach their children that 
owners have the right to exclude others from property, yet children seem to have an early 
understanding of ownership rights nonetheless. 
One area where parents do occasionally provide some information about 
ownership, even if only indirectly, is in property disputes (Dunn & Munn, 1987; Ross, 
1996). When two children argue over a toy, parents occasionally intervene to settle the 
dispute. It might seem plausible, then, that children learn about ownership by attending to 




the explanations that parents provide when settling disputes. However, during such 
interventions, parents infrequently discuss the ownership rules relevant to the specific 
property dispute. Instead, they often settle the dispute without any justification for their 
decision (Ross, 1996). Parents are more likely to say ―Give the ball to Tommy‖ rather 
than, ―Give the ball to Tommy because he received it as a gift from Grandma and so it 
belongs to him. As the owner, Tommy is allowed to play with the ball whenever he likes.‖ 
It is possible that children do not learn from what parents say, but instead abstract 
the rules of ownership from observations of how the parents‘ judge property disputes. 
Children may notice that parents typically favour owners by awarding them the object in 
dispute. Thus, children may learn that owners have a special privilege and they will 
subsequently uphold the owner‘s rights in future disputes, even in the absence of any 
parental intervention. However appealing this analysis is, it appears doubtful. As 
previously mentioned, during property disputes, personal observations and other studies 
(Ross, 1996) reveal many inconsistencies in adults who interact with children in schools, 
daycare settings, and home environments. Often adults will attempt to resolve the conflicts 
quickly without ever considering who the owners of the objects are (Ross, 1996). This 
may result in the adults awarding temporary possession of an object to the child who 
would most strongly object to having the object removed, rather than to the actual owner. 
For example, if Tommy and Sarah are arguing over who gets to use a ball, a parent may 
decide who should get the ball based on the two children‘s temperaments, with no 
consideration for ownership. Since Tommy is easygoing and more likely to move on and 
play with something else if he loses possession of the object, a parent may decide to award 




the ball to Sarah, who is considerably more likely to be upset by not getting the ball, 
because this will allow for a quicker resolution of the dispute.  
The lack of ownership-related instruction and the inconsistent use of rationales to 
support the rules associated with ownership, cannot provide children with a strong sense 
of how they should behave during property disputes. Imagine if parents instructed children 
to eat their spaghetti with a fork half of the time and to use their hands the other half of the 
time. Children would certainly have difficulty learning that they should actually use a fork 
to eat spaghetti and that it would be impolite to use their hands. Yet; despite similar 
inconsistencies in parents‘ ownership instructions children still uphold ownership rights. 
The only consistent instruction that children receive related to ownership is that it 
is important to share (Ross, 1996). If children mainly learned about ownership from 
parental input, they would believe that, as owners, they have the right to play with their 
objects only if no other children are interested in playing. Children would also believe that 
owners are obligated to share everything they own and non-owners have the right to play 
with any object they see because owners have an obligation to share. Yet this clearly is not 
what the children believe, nor is it what they expect when they come across an object. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that children gain their main sense of understanding about 
ownership from parental input. Instead, they must have some other source(s) for their 
knowledge about ownership.  
The hypothesis that motivates this dissertation is that there is something distinctive 
about ownership that enables children to understand its key concepts, despite a lack of 
instruction and/or inconsistent instructions. According to this nativist view, children are 
equipped with a very early concept of ownership. This ownership concept allows children 




to make intuitive inferences about ownership. For example, children can recognize (even 
without any explicit instruction) who the owner of an object is, and may have intuitions 
about what rights and privileges should be associated with owning an object. For instance, 
if Tommy observes Sarah kicking a ball at the park and then walking away from it, 
Tommy will instantly believe that Sarah is the owner. Furthermore, Tommy will believe 
that, even though no one is currently playing with the ball, he should not begin playing 
with it unless he asks for permission. However, if a child encounters an object that is 
unlikely to have an owner, then the child will feel free to interact with the object. For 
example, if Tommy observes Sarah kicking a pinecone at the park and then walking away 
from it, Tommy will not assume that Sarah is the owner and will most likely not ask her 
for permission to play with it. 
While in both situations, Tommy sees an unattended object that he is interested in 
interacting with, he is sensitive to the differences between the two scenarios. Tommy is 
able to differentiate between when he needs to ask permission and when he is free to 
interact with the object; he effortlessly activates the owner concept in one situation, but 
not in the other. This ability to differentiate is remarkable considering that Tommy is 
unlikely to have received parental input regarding discriminating between these types of 
situations.  The claim is not that children have an innate understanding of which objects 
are owned versus which objects are un-owned. Rather, once children come into contact 
with an object that could be owned, they are quickly able to determine who the owner is 
and have intuitions about which rights and privileges go along with ownership.   
The viewpoint that an ownership concept could be innate does not imply that 
children are able to understand the ownership concept at birth. Similarly, the claim that 




growing teeth is innate does not mean that children are born with teeth. Rather, children 
are predisposed to having teeth, but still need a minimal level of nutrition and must reach 
a certain chronological age before the growing of a full set of teeth is triggered. Likewise, 
children are not born instantly understanding ownership, but instead need to interact with 
objects and with other individuals in relation to these objects before they are able to act 
upon their initial concepts of ownership. If children were to grow up without objects, it is 
unlikely that the concept of ownership would be triggered. Furthermore, if somehow the 
concept of ownership were triggered (i.e., children recognized that they were the owner of 
the object), they would have little use for an understanding of the rights of ownership, 
such as the right to exclude, because they would never came across anyone who might 
attempt to acquire the object.  
When considering this account, it is important to note that needing experience to 
trigger the ownership concept is not the same as needing experience to learn the 
ownership concept. The former implies that the concept of ownership is already present, 
but that a certain amount of experience is needed to activate this understanding. This is 
similar to the need for a certain level of nutrition and development is to trigger the growth 
of teeth. The latter implies that the concept of ownership is not present and that experience 
is needed to acquire the concept of ownership.  
The viewpoint that an ownership concept may be innate does not preclude any 
type of ownership learning from occurring. Children could have an innate concept of 
ownership, which allows them to learn about ownership-related concepts with little direct 
teaching. For instance, children may not need to be taught that objects (and perhaps even 
non-objects such as ideas or songs) can be owned, but might need to be taught the specific 




ways in which ownership is legitimately acquired (purchase, trade, or gift exchange) or 
transferred within their culture.  Similarly, children might not have to be taught the rights 
and privileges of ownership, but might require instruction on when to disregard these 
rights. For example, children might feel that they should be allowed to wear a shirt that 
belongs to them whenever they like. They may need to be taught that since they have 
outgrown the shirt, they should transfer ownership of the shirt (and the rights to wear the 
shirt whenever he likes) to a little brother.  
This view of ownership yields the following developmental theory: children have 
an innate concept of ownership and strong intuitions about which rights should go along 
with ownership. Initially, children strongly uphold owners‘ rights (ownership bias) and are 
expected to prioritize ownership above all or most other factors when deciding who is 
entitled to an object involved in a property dispute. During development, children learn 
when it would be appropriate and expected to override their rigid beliefs. Specifically, 
children learn when they should be taking into account information other than ownership. 
Thus, children do not have to be taught the concept of ownership or the value of 
ownership; instead, they simply need to learn the specific situations when they must 
consider additional information, placing ownership in context. Adults involved in a child‘s 
life (parents, teachers, and babysitters) do not directly teach children an ownership 
concept, but instead teach them how to be flexible in their developing intuitions about 
ownership. 
A learning theorist may propose that ownership is very salient for children and that 
little experience is needed for learning to occur. Perhaps children only need to be 
instructed that something belongs to them a few times before they learn to have a strong 




ownership bias. However, it would be difficult to explain how young children could learn 
to have an ownership bias if parents are not providing them with direct instruction. If 
ownership is gradually learned from experience, why do children as young as 3-years-old 
already have a strong ownership bias? It would also be difficult to explain how young 
children could come to learn about the rights associated with ownership if they did not 
already have a concept of ―own‖ in the first place. For instance, if a parent intervened in a 
property dispute between Billy and Susie by telling Susie to give the toy back to Billy 
because he is the owner, it would be difficult to see what this would mean to either child 
involved in the dispute if they did not already have a concept of own. If they lacked this 
concept then they may come to learn that when an authority figure asks you to give a toy 
to another child you should comply, but it is unlikely that either would come to learn that 
a person has rights associated with a toy simply because he is the owner. Moreover, 
learning about ownership would be very difficult because ownership is invisible and 
abstract. When you look at an object you cannot see if the object has an owner, who the 
owner may be, or which rights and privileges are associated with owning the object. 
Therefore, it is difficult to see how children could come to understand ownership, much 
less come to value ownership rights. Furthermore, the progression of children‘s ownership 
concept does not follow the development trend one would expect if ownership was 
learned. If children learn the concept of ownership, then you would expect that the 
concept would be lacking early in development and that children would acquire it later on, 
perhaps by learning from their parents. You would not expect young children to strongly 
value ownership and the rights associated with it.  




It would be impossible to prove the innateness theory in one set of studies (or even 
hundreds of studies). Instead, this dissertation will test the hypothesis that children do not 
simply mirror adult input regarding ownership, but instead have an early ownership bias. 
If children do have an ownership bias, then this suggests that children not only have a 
sense of what ownership is, but that they also value the rights associated with ownership. 
If adults/parents do not explicitly demonstrate that they themselves value ownership rights 
over other principles of entitlement, then it would be difficult to explain how children 
could come to value ownership rights so early in development. I would argue that this 
early bias would follow more naturally from a nativist viewpoint than from a learning 
viewpoint.  
Understanding ownership has two parts: the concept owner and the rights that 
come with being an owner. My thesis will not specifically address children‘s knowledge 
of owner. Instead, my thesis will investigate children‘s knowledge of ownership rights. 
This thesis presents five experiments examining how children and adults reason about 
ownership rights during property allocation disputes. Taken together, the results allow us 
to determine whether children share adults‘ intuitions about ownership rights or whether 
they have their own way of reasoning.  
In previous studies, parents and children have demonstrated their understanding of 
ownership rights in situations in which they had a vested interest. This may have 
influenced the results of those studies as the children and parents seemed to have different 
goals in the dispute. In the following studies, I assessed children‘s understanding of 
ownership rights by removing any self-interest. I also explored adults‘ intuitions regarding 
ownership during property allocation disputes that they or their children were not involved 




in. To do this I used third person methodology to assess whether preschoolers and adults 
differ in their reasoning following the observation of property allocation disputes. If there 
is a mismatch between children‘s and adults‘ resolutions of the property allocation 
disputes, then adult input may not include information about the rights of owners. 
In the first experiment, I attempted to determine whether children or adults 
demonstrate an ownership bias, siding with the owner of the object despite there being a 
valid reason for a non-owner to be given temporary possession of an object. This type of 
dispute is familiar to children; they occasionally witness and perhaps take part in such 
situations themselves.  
In the second experiment, I investigated children‘s and adults‘ reasoning about 
ownership during another type of property dispute. Would children continue to have an 
ownership bias when they knew that the owner did not have any valid reason for 
requesting the object in dispute? Arguably, the most socially acceptable/fairest way of 
resolving a dispute of this kind would be to allow the current possessor to continue using 
the object because the owner does not have a need for the object. If children continue to 
side with the owner, then this would demonstrate not only that children have a strong 
ownership bias, but also that they uphold an owner‘s right to exclude. Children should 
have no reason to side with the owner during this type of dispute unless they strongly 
value an owner‘s right to exclude (even in the absence of a good reason for the exclusion).   
In the third experiment, I investigated children‘s and adults‘ reasoning about 
ownership rights during disputes between two adult characters over the use of objects that 
would be considered more valuable (i.e., both in monetary worth and also in importance) 
than the objects that were the focus of the disputes in the Experiment 1 and 2.  I was 




interested in determining whether children and adults reason about ownership rights 
during property allocation disputes with adult characters similarly or differently than they 
do during property allocation disputes between children. 
In the fourth and fifth experiments, I investigated children‘s and adults‘ reasoning 
about ownership rights during situations that warrant the violation of owners‘ rights. 
Specifically, I investigated whether children can override the ownership bias when a non-
owner needs to use an owner‘s property to prevent harm from occurring (Experiment 4) or 
when an owner intends to misuse his property to cause harm (Experiment 5). Determining 
whether children will override the ownership bias in this type of circumstance will help to 
determine whether this bias is inflexible, or whether children are able to override the bias 
when provided with strong enough reasons to do so.  
My thesis explores the difference between children‘s and adults‘ property 
entitlement reasoning in situations where they are not personally involved and therefore 
should not have a vested interest in the outcome. There are four main questions that I hope 
to answer with this research. First, do children and adults differ in their intuitions about 
ownership issues during property disputes? Second, do children have an ownership bias? 
Specifically, do children tend to side with the owner during property disputes despite there 
being compelling reasons for the non-owner to be given temporary possession? Third, 
assuming that an ownership bias exists, how strong is it and are there some situations 
where children can disregard it? Fourth, do children understand the right of exclusion and 
if so do they appear to value this right more than adults? The answers to these questions 
will inform us about how children reason about something that is abstract and invisible. 
 




Chapter Three: Experiment 1 
 
 
In the first experiment, I investigated whether children and adults reason similarly 
about ownership during property disputes. Within each age group, half the participants 
received tasks in which two characters each wanted to use the same object. One character 
possessed the object and had a reason for continuing to use the object and the other 
character wanted the object (wanter) and was the owner of the object. If children have an 
ownership bias, they should disregard the need that the current possessor had for the 
object and instead side with the owner (wanter). However, children could have sided with 
the owner for other reasons that do not involve an ownership bias. First, young children 
might not have been able to consider a character‘s need when making allocation decisions 
during property disputes. Second, children might not have been able to consider more than 
one factor when making allocation decisions. To rule out these possibilities, half of the 
participants in each age group received a non-ownership condition that was identical to the 
ownership condition, except that neither character owned the object. One character needed 
the object (and possessed it during the dispute) and the other character wanted to use the 
object, but did not need it (and did not own it).  
If children have an ownership bias, than one should expect that in the ownership 
condition children would disregard the non-owner‘s reason for needing the object, and 
instead uphold the rights of the owner. However, if there was no owner involved in the 
dispute (non-ownership condition), and children are able to consider the importance of 
current possession and need, then children should side with the character that currently 
possessed the object and needed it to complete a task.  




Based on the results from Ross‘s (1996) findings, I expected that the adults would 
not support owners over non-owners, but would instead support the character that 
currently possessed the object and needed the object to finish a card. I expected them to 
reason this way regardless of who the owner of the object was.  
Method 
Subjects.  Fifty-six children were tested: 16 3-year-olds (age range = from 3 years 
0 months to 3 years 10 months; M = 3 years 6 months; 8 girls and 8 boys), 18 4-year-olds 
(age range = from 4 years 0 months to 4 years 11 months; M = 4 years  5 months; 10 girls 
and 8 boys) and 22 5-year-olds (age range = from 5 years 0 months to 5 years 10 months; 
M = 5 years  3 months; 13 girls and 9 boys). In this experiment and all subsequent 
children were recruited from and tested at their daycares, preschools, and elementary 
schools. Most were white and from middle-class families, though demographic 
information was not formally collected. Nine additional 3-year-olds were seen, but failed 
to answer the memory questions correctly in the non-ownership condition. As a result, all 
remaining 3-year-olds were tested in the ownership condition only (described further in 
the Results section). In addition, three 3-year-olds in the ownership condition, three 4-
year-olds in each of the ownership and non-ownership conditions, and two 5-year-olds in 
the non-ownership condition also failed to answer the memory questions correctly and 
were excluded from further analysis.  
Forty-four adults were tested (age range = from 18 years to 25 years, M = 20 years; 
(21 females and 23 males). Adults were recruited and tested at a University of Waterloo 
campus student center. Also, different children and different adults participated in each 
experiment. 




Materials and procedure.  Children were given a screening task to ensure that they 
had the basic language ability and skill necessary to understand and participate in the task. 
The screening task was presented on an 8 ½ x 11 page. The page had a picture of an 
animal in each corner (rabbit, snake, horse, and monkey). Children were asked to point to 
each animal (for example, ―Can you point to the monkey?‖). To pass the screening task, 
children were required to point to three out of four animals correctly. No children failed 
the screening task in this experiment or any of the following experiments. 
Immediately following the screening task, children watched two stories enacted on 
a foam board stage using small replicas of children and toys; different replicas were used 
for each story. In each story, a boy and a girl character were positioned a few inches apart 
facing the participant. An object (a crayon in story 1, scissors in story 2) was placed 
directly beside one of the characters (i.e., the character who was described in the stories as 
the current possessor). Participants were randomly assigned to either the ownership 
condition or the non-ownership condition. 
In the ownership condition, the two characters were at school. Character A was 
using the object, but character B wanted to use the object and was its owner. A sample 
story from this condition is presented below: 
This is a story about these two kids at school. This one is a boy and this 
one is a girl. And what is this? It is a__(crayon). The crayon belongs to 
the girl; it‘s the girl‘s crayon. Pre memory question: Whose crayon is it? 
(girl). Well, the boy is using the crayon to make a birthday card for his 
mom. He needs the crayon to finish the card. The girl wants to use the 
crayon. I have some questions for you. 




The non-ownership condition was nearly identical except I said that the school 
owns the object.  
The sample story from this condition is presented below: 
This is a story about these two kids at school. This one is a boy and this 
one is a girl and what is this? It is a __(crayon). The crayon belongs to 
the school; it‘s the school‘s crayon. Pre-memory question: Whose 
crayon is it? (school). Well, the girl is using the crayon to make a 
birthday card for her mom. She needs the crayon to finish the card. The 
boy wants to use the crayon. I have some questions for you. 
Immediately following the stories, children were asked two questions (always in 
the same order)—a test question and a post memory question. The pre- and post-memory 
questions were asked to ensure that the participants followed the story.  
1) Test question. Who should get to use the crayon?  
2) Post-memory question. Whose crayon is it?  
Adults were given the same two stories as the children with slight modifications.  
Adults were given cartoon depictions of the main task (see Appendix A for an example) 
displayed on a computer using PowerPoint and they were not asked the pre-memory 
question. The stories were narrated by the experimenter just as they were for the children. 
Adults were randomly assigned into the ownership or non-ownership conditions.  
Within each condition and age group, two factors were fully counterbalanced 
between subjects: (1) whether boy characters were on the right and girl characters were on 
the left in both stories, or the reverse; (2) whether the child with the need for the object 
was a boy in the first story and a girl in the second, or the reverse.  





Participants were scored 0 for choosing the current user of the object and 1 for 
choosing the other character who wanted the object. Therefore, for the two scenarios, 
participants could obtain a maximum score of 2 points 1 point on each.  A 2 (condition: 
ownership, control) X 3 (age: four, five, adult) ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
condition, F(1, 78) = 46.73, p < .01, a main effect of age, F(2, 78) = 12.40, p < .01, and a 
interaction between condition and age, F(2, 78) = 4.71, p < .01. I was interested in 
determining whether children at both ages would reason similarly to each other but 
differently from adults. Therefore, I conducted an additional 2 (condition: ownership, 
control) X 2 (age: four, five) ANOVA. There was a main effect of condition, F(1, 36) = 
33.10, p < .01, but no main effect of age, F(1, 36) = .43, p = .52, and no interaction 
between condition and age, F(1,36) = 0.01, p = .94). As a result, findings from the 4-and 
5-year-olds were combined for further analysis, and they are henceforth referred to 
collectively as ―children‖.  
A 2 (condition: ownership, control) X 2 (age: children, adult) ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of condition, F(1, 80) = 40.29, p < .01, a main effect of age, F(1, 80) = 24.69, 
p < .01, and a interaction between condition and age, F(1, 80) = 9.45, p < .01. As can be 
seen in Figure1, the main effect was due to the fact that participants at both ages were 
more likely to choose the wanter when this character was the owner (ownership condition) 
than when this character was not the owner (non-ownership condition) (children: t(38) = 
5.87, p < .01; adults: t(42) = 2.66, p = .01). However, as shown by the age x condition 
interaction, this difference was greater for children than for adults. One-sample t-test 
showed that the interaction was due to the fact that while children and adults 




systematically judged that the wanter should not be given the object when it was owned 
by the school (children: t (18) = 5.71, p < .01; adults: t test could not be run because 
variance was 0), children were the only ones (children 79%, adults 23%) who 
systematically judged that the wanter should be given the object when he/she was its 
owner (children: t(20) = 3.23, p < .01; adults: t(21) = 3.20, p < .01 ).   
As noted in the participants section, 3-year-olds had difficulty with the non-
ownership condition. In this condition, children were told that the school owned the 
crayon. After nine 3-year-olds had been tested, it was observed that they had difficulty 
with the pre- and post-memory questions (―Whose crayon is it?‖) in the non-ownership 
condition. Ninety percent of the 3-year-olds attributed ownership to the character currently 
possessing the object rather than attributing ownership to the school. However, most 
children in the ownership condition successfully answered this question. Presumably, 3-
year-olds had difficulty in assigning ownership to an institution and were more successful 
at attributing ownership to a specific person. As a result, all remaining 3-year-olds were 
tested in the ownership condition only and were therefore excluded from the above 
analysis due to the absence of the non-ownership condition. 
An additional analysis (one-way ANOVA) tested whether 3-year-olds would differ 
from the 4- and 5-year-olds in the ownership condition. When the wanter was the owner 
(ownership condition), 3-year-olds did not differ from 4- and 5-year olds (F(2, 37) = 0.37, 
p = .69) and most (69%) tended to judge that the wanter should have the object in dispute 
(t(15) = 1.86, p = .08).  
Discussion 
 This study examined two principles of entitlement: current possession and 
ownership. I sought to determine whether reasoning about these principles of entitlement 




would vary with age or would depend upon the specific details of the dispute. I found that 
children and adults do differ reliably in their reasoning about ownership during this type 
of property entitlement dispute.  
 Adults sided with the character that was using the crayon over the character that 
owned it, regardless of whether the character that wanted to use the object was its owner. 
This finding suggests that adults value possession rights over other factors such as a 
characters‘ desire for an object or an owner‘s right to use his object. In contrast, children 
varied their responses depending upon the specific details of the dispute. If there was no 
owner involved in the dispute, they reasoned like adults and sided with the character that 
currently possessed the object. However, if the owner was involved in the dispute (as the 
wanter who did not currently possess the object) children overwhelmingly sided against 
the possessor and instead sided with the wanter. This finding suggests that children have 
an ownership bias. That is, children appear to value the rights of an owner so strongly that 
they side with the owner during property disputes despite there being compelling reasons 
for the non-owner to be given temporary possession. 
It should be noted that adults were not completely unaffected by the presence of 
the owner. Although adults were more likely to support the rights of the possessor in both 
the ownership and non-ownership condition, they sided with the wanter more often in the 
ownership condition than in the non-ownership condition. This finding is important 
because it demonstrates that both children and adults are influenced by the presence of an 
owner in their decision making. However, adults appear to value the other factors, such as 
the character‘s need for the object, more strongly than the owner‘s rights, whereas 
children appear to value the rights of the owner above all other factors. 




It could be argued that children did not make their decision purely on the basis of 
ownership, but in fact considered ownership along with additional factors. For instance, 
there is a possibility that children sided with the owner because they felt that the owner 
must have a good reason for asking for the crayon back (even though no such reason was 
provided) and in light of the fact that he was both the owner and had a need for the object, 
children may have felt that this character was more deserving of the object. I conducted a 
second experiment to rule out this possibility.  
In the next experiment, I investigated whether children would continue to 
demonstrate an ownership bias when presented with a story in which it was made clearer 
that the owner did not have any good reason to want the object. I also examined children 
across a broader range of ages (4- to 7-years-old) to determine what the range of 
development the ownership bias applies to. I was especially interested in determining if 
school age children would have an ownership bias or if they would reason more similarly 
to adults. In Experiment 1, 3-year-olds had difficulty attributing ownership to the school 
in the non-ownership condition. Therefore, in Experiment 2, I added a third character, a 
teacher, and in the non-ownership condition children were told that the teacher was the 
owner of the object.  
  




Chapter Four: Experiment 2A 
 
 
Children again watched scenarios where two characters each wanted to use the 
same object. One character possessed the object, and had reason for using it. The other 
character owned the object, and although he had no reason for requesting the object, he 
objected to the first character‘s use of the object. In this scenario, children might be less 
willing to side with the owner because the owner does not currently need or want to use 
the object. If children continued to side with the owner, this would then suggest that 
children value the rights of owners so strongly that they are biased toward only 
considering the owner‘s point of view. This would provide further evidence that children 
strongly value owners‘ rights—the ownership bias.  It is also possible that children may 
feel that owners have the right to their property in all instances, even when they have no 
reason to use the object—ownership is 10/10 of the law. Because of their belief in owners‘ 
rights, children will not or cannot consider any other factors that may give a non-owner 
the right to the property.  
If children have an ownership bias relative to adults, than one would again expect 
that in the ownership condition children would disregard the non-owner‘s reason for 
needing the object, and instead would uphold the rights of the owner. While adults would 
be expected to instead prioritize the non-owner‘s need for the object over the owner‘s 
right to his object, and side with the possessor.   
An alternative explanation for why children may once again side with the owner 
during this experiment could be that children are incapable of considering lack of need 
when making allocation decisions during ownership disputes. To rule out this possibility, 
the remaining participants in each age group received a non-ownership condition in which 




one character possessed the object and had a need for continued use and the other 
character objected, but did not appear to have a reason for wanting it. Since there was no 
owner involved in the dispute in this condition, one would expect that children and adults 
would both side with the character that currently possessed the object and needed it to 
complete a task.  
Method 
Subjects. One hundred and nine children were tested: 29 4-year-olds (age range = 
from 4 years 0 months to 4 years 11 months; M = 4 years  5 months; 17 girls and 12 boys), 
26 5-year-olds (age range = from 5 years 0 months to 5 years 10 months; M = 5 years  5 
months; 17 girls and 9 boys), 27 6-year-olds (age range = from 6 years 0 months to 6 
years 11 months; M = 6 years  5 months; 14 girls and 13 boys), and 27 7-year-olds (age 
range = from 7 years 0 months to 7 years 11 months; M = 7 years  5 months; 18 girls and 9 
boys). One 4-year-old in the ownership condition and two 5-year-olds (one in each 
condition) were eliminated due to shyness (failure to respond to questions). 
Forty adults were tested (age range = from 17 years to 27 years, M = 20 years; 21 
females and 18 males). Adults were recruited and tested at a University of Waterloo 
campus student centre.  
Materials and procedure.  Children were given the same screening task as in 
Experiment 1.  Immediately following the screening task, children watched two stories 
enacted on a foam board stage using small replicas of children and toys; different replicas 
were used for each story. In each story, a boy and a girl character were positioned a few 
inches apart facing the participant. A third character, the teacher, was positioned in the 
back right hand side of the stage. A toy object (a crayon in story 1, scissors in story 2) was 




placed directly beside one of the characters (the character who was described in the stories 
as the current possessor). Participants were randomly assigned to either the ownership 
condition or the non-ownership condition. In this experiment participants were asked two 
test questions (rather than one) to rule out the possibility of a yes/no bias. Participants 
were asked: ―Would it be ok for the girl/boy to keep using the crayon? And ―Should 
he/she stop using the crayon?‖. If children responded with a yes bias or a no bias then 
their answers would contradict themselves (i.e., answering no to the first question would 




In the ownership condition, the two characters were at school. One character was 
using the object, but the other character (the owner) wanted him to stop using the object 
immediately. Here is a sample story from this condition: 
This is a story about these two kids at school. This one is a boy and 
this one is a girl. And this is their teacher. And what is this? It is 
a__(crayon): Well, the crayon belongs to the girl. It is the girl‘s 
crayon. Pre-memory question: Whose crayon is it? (girl) Well, the 
boy is using the crayon to make a birthday card for his mom. He 
needs the crayon to finish the card. The girl wants him to stop using 
the crayon. She wants him to stop using it right now. I have some 
questions for you.  
 
The non-ownership condition was nearly identical except that the teacher owned 
the object. The sample story from this condition is presented below: 




This is a story about these two kids at school. This one is a boy and 
this one is a girl and this is their teacher. And what is this? It is a 
__(crayon). The crayon belongs to the teacher. She lets everyone in 
the class use it. Pre- memory question: Whose crayon is it? (teacher). 
Well, the girl is using the crayon to make a birthday card for her 
mom. She needs the crayon to finish the card. The boy wants her to 
stop using the crayon. He wants her to stop using it right now. I have 
some questions for you.  
Immediately following the stories, children were asked three question (always in 
the same order).  
1) Test question one. Would it be ok for the girl/boy to keep using the crayon? 
2) Test question two. Should he/she stop using the crayon? 
3) Post-memory question. Whose crayon is it? 
Adults were given the same stories as the children with the same modifications 
mentioned in Experiment 1. Adults were randomly assigned to the ownership or non-
ownership conditions. 
Within each condition and age group, two factors were fully counterbalanced 
between subjects: (1) whether boy characters were on the right and girl characters were on 
the left in both stories, or the reverse; (2) whether the child with the need for the object 
was a boy in the first story and a girl in the second, or the reverse. 
Results 
Participants were scored 0 for siding with the current user of the object and 1 point 
for siding with the character who wanted the user to stop using the object. Participants 




could obtain a maximum score of 4 points (2 points per story as each story had two 
questions). A 2 (condition: ownership, control) X 5 (age: four, five, six, seven, adult) 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition, F(1,138) = 142.50, p < .01, a main effect of 
age, F(4,138) = 8.97, p < .01, and a interaction between condition and age, F(4, 138) = 
3.01, p =.02. I was interested in determining whether children at all ages would reason 
similarly to each other but different from adults. Therefore, I conducted an additional 2 
(condition: ownership, control) X 4 (age: four, five, six, seven) ANOVA. There was a 
effect of condition, F(1, 101) = 128.85, p < .01, but no main effect of age, F(3, 101) = .74, 
p = .52, and no interaction between condition and age, F(3, 101) =2.00, p = .12. As a 
result, findings from the 4- to 7-year-olds were combined for further analysis, and they are 
henceforth referred to as ―children‖. 
A 2 (condition: ownership, control) X 2 (age: children, adult) ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of condition, F(1, 144) = 82.06, p < .01, a main effect of age, F(1, 144) = 
32.74, p < .01, and a interaction between condition and age, F(1, 144) = 6.09, p < .01. As 
can be seen in Figure 2, The main effect was due to the fact that children and adults were 
more likely to choose the wanter when this character was the owner (ownership condition) 
than when this character was not the owner (non-ownership condition) (children: t(107) = 
11.23, p < .01; adults: t(37) = 3.84, p < .01). However, as shown by the age x condition 
interaction, this preference was greater for children, than for adults. One-sample t-test 
showed that the interaction was due to the fact that while children and adults 
systematically judged that the wanter should not be given the object when it was owned 
by the teacher (children: t(53) = 7.52, p < .01; adults: t test could not be run because 
variance was 0), children were the only ones (children 84%), who systematically judged 




that the wanter should be given the object when he/she was its owner (children: t(54) = 
8.38, p < .01; adults: t(19) = 1.31, p = .20).  
Discussion 
In this experiment, I sought to determine whether children would continue to 
uphold the owner‘s rights even when the owner expressed no desire to actually use the 
object. I also examined children across a broader range of ages to determine whether 
school-aged children would show an ownership bias or whether by that age they would 
reason similarly to adults.  
Adults once again sided with the character that was currently using the object over 
the character that wanted to use the object, regardless of whether the character that wanted 
the object was the owner. Once again, this demonstrates that adults value other factors, 
such as the character‘s need for the object, more strongly than the owner‘s right to his 
object. In contrast, children across a wide range of ages were more strongly influenced by 
who owned the object than they were with why the non-owner wanted to use the object.  
Thus, when the owner was involved in the dispute (as the wanter), children disregarded 
the fact that the owner did not have a compelling reason for wanting his object, and 
instead upheld the owner‘s right to use his object. However, if the owner was not involved 
in the dispute, then children reasoned like adults and sided with the character that 
currently possessed the object.  
This replicates the ownership bias found in preschoolers in Experiment 1, and 
demonstrates that school-aged children also appear to have an ownership bias. Pre-school 
and school-aged children value the rights of owners so strongly that they are biased 
toward only considering the owner‘s point of view while disregarding persuasive reasons 




for the non-owner to be given temporary possession. It is surprising that school-age 
children continue to support the rights of owners‘ despite the additional years of 
experience they would have received from adults instructing them that the most socially 
acceptable thing to do would be to share the object with someone that had a need for 
temporary possession. The finding that school-age children also have an ownership bias 
contradicts the intuitive view that children‘s understanding of ownership rights is strongly 
influenced by parental input.  
The results of this experiment demonstrate not only that children have a strong 
ownership bias, but also that they uphold an owner‘s right to exclude. Presumably, 
children would have no reason to side with the owner during this type of dispute unless 
they strongly valued the owner‘s right to exclude (even in the absence of a good reason for 
the exclusion).   
In this experiment, participants were asked two test questions: ―Would it be ok for 
the boy to keep using the crayon?‖ and ―Should she/he stop using the crayon?‖ In piloting, 
I found that 3-year-olds had difficulty understanding one of the test questions asked 
(―Would it be ok for the boy to keep using the crayon?‖). As a result, only 4- to 7-year-
olds were tested. However, I was interested in determining whether 3-year-olds would 
reason similarly to the older children (and differently from adults). Therefore, an 
additional experiment (Experiment 2B) tested whether 3-year-olds would perform 
similarly to the older children and continue (as in Experiment 1) to judge that the wanter 
should have the object in the dispute when this character was also the owner. Experiment 
2B also sought to determine whether 3-year-olds would reason similarly to all age groups 




and judge that the user should have the object when there is no owner involved in the 
dispute (non-ownership condition).   
 
  








Subjects. Twenty-eight 3-year-olds (age range = from 3 years 0 months to 3 years 
11 months; M = 3 years 5 months; 15 girls and 13 boys) were tested. An additional child 
was eliminated from analysis due to shyness (failure to respond to questions). 
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure for Experiment 2B were 
identical to those of Experiment 2A with one modification: Children were only given the 
second test question (―Should she stop using the crayon?‖).  
Results  
Participants were scored 0 for siding with the current user of the object and 1 point 
for siding with the other character who wanted the object. Participants could obtain a 
maximum score of 2 points.  
An initial analysis tested whether 3-year-olds differed in score across conditions. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, three-year-olds were more likely to choose the wanter when 
this character was the owner (ownership condition) than when this character was not the 
owner (non-ownership condition) (t(26) = 5.20, p < .01). Further analyses against a chance 
score of 1 revealed that 3-year-olds in the ownership condition sided with the wanter 
(93%) far more often than chance (t(13) = 6.00, p< .01). In the non-ownership condition, 
when ownership was not attributed to one of the characters involved in the dispute, 3-









In Experiment 2B, I sought to determine whether 3-year-olds would have an 
ownership bias when judging property disputes placing possession rights against 
ownership rights, and whether they would reason differently about these principles of 
entitlement when the specific details of the dispute changed. Specifically, I sought to 
determine whether 3-year-olds would value ownership as strongly as the older children 
when judging property entitlement disputes. 
Three-year-olds, in Experiment 2B, like 4- to 7-year-olds in Experiment 2A, varied 
their judgments depending upon the details of the property dispute. If there was no owner 
involved in the dispute, 3-year-olds reasoned like the older children and the adults, siding 
with the character that currently possessed the object. However, if the owner was involved 
in the dispute (as the wanter who did not currently possess the object) children 
overwhelmingly sided against the possessor and instead sided with the wanter. This 
replicates the findings from Experiment 1 and once again suggests that 3-year-olds have 
an ownership bias. 
 Together, these studies (Experiments 1, 2A and 2B) suggest developmental 
changes in reasoning about ownership: Pre-scholars and school-aged children alike 
strongly value an owner‘s rights and are biased to uphold these rights to the exclusion of 
all other factors (ownership bias) and will even continue to support owner‘s rights despite 
presumably having experienced many years of parental input suggesting that an owner 
should share their property.  However, adults do not appear to value ownership as much as 
children and are therefore able to minimize the influence of ownership when provided 
with reasons to do so.   




Chapter Six:  Experiment 3 
 
 
The previous experiments demonstrated that children and adults differ in their 
reasoning about ownership. Children valued ownership rights, such as the right of 
exclusion and the right of use, much more strongly than adults did. However, in the 
previous experiments, the adults were judging property disputes between two child 
characters. These characters were in disputes over objects that had little monetary value 
for adults. As a result, adults may not have considered the owners‘ rights as much as they 
would during adult property disputes between adult characters over more valuable objects.  
To examine this, participants were shown property disputes between two adult 
characters, and in which the objects were of greater monetary value. Reasoning about 
ownership rights during the types of property disputes that adults might find themselves 
involved in, could provide us with a more accurate understanding of adults‘ ownership 
reasoning. If adults do value ownership rights, but only during adult-related scenarios, 
then they should now side with the owner over the current possessor. However, if adults 
generally value other principles of entitlement, like current possession and need, over the 
rights of owners, then they should continue to side with the character that currently 
possesses the object.  
I expected the results of this study to closely resemble those of the previous 
studies. Because of children‘s tendency to uphold owners‘ rights and inability to consider 
other factors involved in the disputes, I did not expect the value of the object or the age of 
the characters involved in the dispute to change the types of judgments that children or 
adults make. Therefore, I expected children to continue to strongly value ownership above 
current possession and need and therefore to side with the owner. In contrast, I expected 




that the adults would once again prioritize the non-owners need for the object in dispute, 
and judge that the possessor should get the object. Thus, I predicted that children and 
adults would continue to differ in how strongly they valued the owner‘s rights. I was also 
interested in determining whether the adults‘ reasoning depended upon the monetary value 
of the object. Therefore, participants were presented with objects that varied in their 
monetary value. In story one participants were asked to judge disputes involving a shovel 
and in story two they were asked to judge disputes involving a cell phone (higher 
monetary value). 
Method 
Subjects.  Twenty-two 4-year-olds (age range = from 4 years 1 months to 4 years 
11 months; M = 4 years 6 months; 7 girls and 15 boys) were tested.  
Twenty-two adults were tested (age range = from 17 years to 21 years, M = 18 
years; 9 females and 13 males). Adults were recruited and tested at a University of 
Waterloo campus student cafeteria. 
Materials and procedure.  Children were given the same screening task as in 
Experiments 1and 2. Immediately following the screening task, children watched two 
stories presented on a laptop computer. The stories were presented in PowerPoint using 
cartoon replicas of two adults and 2 different objects; different cartoon replicas were used 
for each story (see Appendices C & D for examples). In each story, a man and a woman 
character were positioned a few inches apart in the middle of the slide. The character that 
was not the owner had an object (owned by the other character) in his/her hand (a shovel 
in story 1, a cell phone in story 2). Participants were only tested in the experimental 
condition as the previous experiments had already ruled out alternative reasons for their 




judgements (preference for judging based on whose turn is next or inability to keep two 
factors in mind). Participants were asked a different test question than previous 
experiments in order to determine if the findings from the previous experiments (children 
support owners‘ rights, while adults support other factors more strongly) would replicate 
in different types of situations. Participants were asked, ―who should get the shovel/cell 
phone right now. The addition of ―right now‖ was added to make clear to the participants 
that I did not mean who should get the object after the first character has finished using it. 
Here is a sample story from this condition: 
This is a story about these two adults. This one is a man and this one 
is a woman, and they are friends. And what is this? It is a__(shovel): 
Well, the shovel belongs to the woman. It is the woman‘s shovel. The 
man is using the shovel to plant a flower. He needs the shovel to 
finish planting the flower. The woman does not want the man to use 
her shovel. She wants him to give it back right now.   
Immediately following the stories, participants were asked a test question  
 Test question. Who should get the shovel right now? 
Children and adults were given the same stories and both were asked only one test 
question. 
Two factors were fully counterbalanced between subjects: (1) whether the male 
characters were on the right and female characters were on the left in both stories, or the 
reverse; (2) whether the person with the need for the object was a man in the first story 
and a female in the second, or the reverse. 
Results 




Participants were scored 0 for choosing the current user of the object and 1 for 
choosing the other character who wanted the object. Participants could obtain a maximum 
score of 2 points over the two stories.  
An initial analysis tested whether scores differed across ages. As can be seen in 
Figure 4, 4-year-olds were more likely to choose the owner than were adults (t(42) = 2.14, 
p = .04). Further analyses investigated whether participants were more or less likely than a 
chance score of 1 to side with the wanter. Four-year-olds sided with the wanter (70%) 
more than chance (t(21) = 2.11, p=.05). However, adults sided with the owner (42%) and 
with the possessor (56%) at about chance rates, (t(21) = 0.83, p = .42).
2 
Discussion 
When judging property disputes between two adult characters, children were 
strongly influenced by the rights of an owner and sided against the current possessor 
despite this characters need for the object. In contrast, adults placed lower value on 
ownership rights and more on current possession and need, and judged that the possessor 
should maintain possession of the object in dispute (however, not at rates exceeding 
chance). The findings from this experiment replicate those from previous experiments and 
demonstrate that children value ownership rights much more strongly than do adults.  
Experiments 1, 2A, 2B, and 3 determined that children have a very strong 
ownership bias that is not easily disregarded when they are given a reason to do so. But 
what happens when children are provided with a more extreme reason for disregarding the 
owner‘s rights?  Experiment 4 investigated the strength of children‘s ownership bias by 
determining whether the bias is rigid or can be overridden by a non-owner‘s extreme need 
for using the object.  




Chapter Seven:  Experiment 4 
 
 
Violation of Owners’ Rights in the Interest of Public Safety 
Despite the fact that an owner‘s rights should be valued, there are some situations 
where other factors should be valued more strongly than an owner‘s rights to use or 
exclude others from his property. For instance, it is sometimes necessary to violate an 
owner‘s rights when this violation is needed to prevent harm toward others. For example, 
if a police officer suspects that a crime is being committed by a homeowner he can enter 
the home without permission from the owner. In this case, the homeowner does not have 
the right to exclude the officer. There are also more common everyday occurrences for 
violating owners‘ rights. For instance, if a child lost his gloves and had to walk to school 
on a very cold winter day, no one would likely object if he borrowed his brother‘s gloves 
without asking, especially if his brother drove to school and would be unlikely to need the 
gloves himself.  
 We know that many adults would likely agree with violating owner‘s rights 
during these and similar types of situations, but would children?  If their ownership bias is 
rigid and inflexible then perhaps they will feel that there is never any reason to violate 
owner‘s rights and would not agree with the violation, even when it was needed to prevent 
harm from occurring. 
Experiment 4 investigated whether children could disregard their ownership bias 
when presented with a situation where disregarding the owner‘s rights was needed to 
prevent harm from occurring 
 




Children watched scenarios where two characters each wanted to use the same 
object. One character had a compelling reason for using the object and the other character 
was the owner of the object. Specifically, the character that was not the owner wanted to 
obtain the object so that he could prevent harm to an animal from occurring. However, the 
owner did not want this character to use his object. Once again, no mention was made 
about the owner‘s intended use for the object. This experiment places two moral principles 
in conflict with each other. Previous studies have shown that children are capable of 
judging moral rules, and that they often judge a moral rule violation that inflicts harm as 
worse than others (Tisak & Turiel, 1984).  
If the ownership bias is rigid and inflexible, than I expect children to side with the 
owner. However, if the ownership bias is flexible and can be overridden in the interest of 
preventing harm, than I expect them to side with the character that needs the object to 
prevent harm to the animal. Adults are expected to side with the character that wants the 
object to help the animal. 
An alternative explanation for why children would side with the owner may be that 
they could not consider that harm would occur to the animal if the non-owner did not 
obtain the object in dispute. To rule out this possibility, half of the participants in each age 
group received a control condition. In the non-ownership (control) condition the character 
protesting the use of the object that was needed to prevent harm had no claim to the object 
(i.e., in this condition, he is not the owner of the object needed). Instead, a third character, 
a teacher, was the owner of the object and lets everyone use the object. Because the owner 
was not involved in the dispute in this condition, one would expect that children and 




adults would both side with the character that wanted the object to prevent harm to the 
animal.  
Method 
Subjects. Ninety-five children were tested: 37 3-year-olds (age range = from 3 
years 0 months to 3 years 11 months; M = 3 years  6 months; 19 girls and 18 boys), 24 4-
year-olds (age range = from 4 years 0 months to 4 years 11 months; M = 4 years  7 
months; 12 girls and 12 boys), and 34 5-year-olds (age range = from 5 years 0 months to 5 
years 11 months; M = 5 years  5 months; 16 girls and 18 boys). An additional three 
children were tested. One 3-year-old failed to answer the memory question in the non-
ownership condition, one 3-year-old in the ownership condition would not participate, and 
one 5-year-old in the non-ownership condition would not participate. All were excluded 
from further analysis. 
Forty-eight adults were tested (age range = from 18 years to 26 years, M = 21; 33 
females and 15 males). Adults were recruited and tested at a University of Waterloo 
campus student center.  
Materials and procedure. Children were given the same screening task as in the 
previous experiments. Immediately following the screening task, children watched two 
stories presented on a lap top computer. The stories were presented in PowerPoint using 
cartoon images of children and toys; different cartoon images were used for each story 
(see Appendices E & F for examples). In each story, a boy and a girl character were 
positioned a few inches apart in the middle of the slide. A third character, the teacher, was 
positioned in the bottom centre of the slide (centred between the two characters). An 
object (a net in story 1, a ladder in story 2) was placed between the two characters. A 




cartoon depiction of a dog stuck in a swimming pool in story 1, and a cat stuck in a tree in 
story 2, was placed in the top centre of the slide. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either the ownership condition or the non-ownership condition. 
In the ownership condition, the two characters were at school. Character A needed 
to use the object to rescue the dog (story 1) or cat (story 2), but character B, the owner of 
the object, did not want character A to use the object. Here is a sample story from this 
condition: 
Story one: This is a story about these two kids at school. This one is a 
boy and this one is a girl. And this is their teacher. And what is this? 
it is a__(net): Well, the net belongs to the girl. It is the girl‘s net. Pre- 
memory question: Whose net is it? (girl) Well, the boy needs to use 
the net because look, his dog is stuck in the swimming pool, and he 
can‘t swim! The boy needs the net to pull his dog out, so that the dog 
will be safe. But the girl doesn‘t want the boy to use the net. I have 
some questions for you.  
 
In the non-ownership condition, children were given an almost identical story 
except that they were told that the teacher was the owner of the object. Here is a sample 
story from this condition: 
This is a story about these two kids at school. This one is a boy and 
this one is a girl. And this is their teacher. And what is this? it is 
a__(net): Well, the net belongs to the teacher, it is the teacher‘s net.  
and she lets everyone use it. Pre- memory question: Whose net is 
it?(teacher). Well, the boy needs to use the net because look, his dog 




is stuck in the swimming pool, and he can‘t swim! The boy needs the 
net to pull his dog out, so that the dog will be safe. But the girl 
doesn‘t want the boy to use the net. I have some questions for you.  
 
Immediately following the stories, children were asked three question (always in 
the same order).  
1) Test question. Would it be ok for the girl/boy to use the net/ladder?  
2) Memory question. What does the girl/boy want to do with the net/ladder?  
3) Post-memory question. Whose net/ladder is it? 
Adults were given the same stories as the children but they were not asked the pre-
memory question. Adults were randomly assigned to the ownership or non-ownership 
conditions.  
Within each condition and age group, two factors were fully counterbalanced 
between subjects: (1) whether boy characters were on the right and girl characters were on 
the left in both stories, or the reverse; (2) whether the child with the need for the object 
was a boy in the first story and a girl in the second, or the reverse. 
Results 
Participants were scored 0 for choosing the character that needed the object and 1 
for choosing the other character who wanted the object (max score = 2, 1 point per story).  
A 2 (condition: ownership, control) X 4 (age: three, four, five, adult) ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of age, F(3,135) = 7.06, p < .01. As can be seen in Figure 5, 3-year-olds were 
more likely to side with the wanter than 4- and 5-year-olds or adults. However, there was 
no main effect of condition, F(1,135) = 2.52, p =.12, and no interaction between condition 
and age, F(3,135) = 1.21, p =.31.  




Although overall there was no main effect of condition or interaction with age, 
further analyses nonetheless examined whether scores varied by condition at any age 
group. Three-year-olds tended to side with the wanter more in the ownership condition 
than in the non-ownership condition (t(35) = 1.91, p = .06). However, there was no effect 
of condition for 4- and 5-year-olds (4-year-olds: t(22) = 0.34, p = .74; 5-year-olds: (32) = 
0.22, p = .83) or adults (t(46) = 1.16, p = .25). 
Additional analyses investigated whether participants chose the wanter more often 
than would be expected by a chance score of 1 in each condition. Three-year-olds did not 
choose the wanter more often than would be expected by chance in either the ownership or 
the non-ownership condition (ownership: t(18) = 1.16, p = .26; non-ownership: t(17) = 
1.56, p = .14). However, 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults chose the wanter less often 
than would be expected by chance in both the ownership condition (4-year-olds: t(11) = 
4.18, p < .01; 5-year-olds: t(17) = 3.40, p < .01; adults: t(23) = 4.00, p < .01) and the non-
ownership conditions (4-year-olds: t(12) = 5.00, p < .01; 5-year-olds: t(16) = 3.05, p < .01; 
adults: t(23) = 7.62, p < .01), with most choosing the character that needed the object 
instead.  
Discussion 
In this experiment, children watched scenarios where one character (non-owner) 
needed to use an object to help save an animal, and another character wanted the object 
and protested (in the ownership condition this character is also the owner) the other 
characters desire to obtain the object to try to save the animal. Adults sided with the 
character who needed to use the object to prevent harm from occurring in both the 
ownership condition and the non-ownership condition. This demonstrates that the adults 




place more value on prevention of harm than on an owner‘s rights to his object. 
Interestingly, in this experiment, most children similarly sided with the character that 
needed the object to help the animal in distress in both conditions. This is the first 
experiment to demonstrate that children can set aside the rights of an owner and instead 
reflect on the reason that a non-owner should be given temporary possession of an object. 
Presumably, when a non-owner has a very compelling reason for using an object (such as 
in the interest of preventing harm to an animal) children are able to set aside the owner‘s 
rights to his object and side with the non-owner. This suggests that children‘s ownership 
bias is not rigid, but rather is flexible and can be overcome when there are convincing 
reasons. 
Although, regardless of the condition, most children sided with the character that 
needed the object to prevent harm, 3-year-olds tended to side with the wanter more often 
in the ownership condition than in the non-ownership condition. However, their scores did 
not depart from chance in either condition (unlike the other ages). One explanation for 3-
year-olds‘ chance-level performance is that they had difficulty understanding the details of 
the story, and simply guessed which character to side with. Although the findings are 
consistent with this interpretation, it is unlikely that children had no understanding of the 
details of the story. If they did have difficulty understanding the stories, they would have 
had similar difficulty with the non-ownership condition and yet there was a clear 
difference in responses between conditions. Furthermore, it is implausible that children 
did not understand the details of the story as the structure of stories in this experiment was 
very similar to the format used for all the stories in this thesis.   




An alternative explanation for the chance-level predictions is that children do 
understand the details of the study, but they are less able to disregard ownership than are 
older children. Perhaps because they value ownership rights so strongly, they uphold these 
rights to the exclusion of all other factors. The fact that the 3-year-olds tended to side 
against the character who wanted the object to prevent harm when the owner was involved 
in the dispute more often than when an owner was not involved in the dispute supports 
this view.  
In this experiment, the object in dispute was placed between the characters and 
neither character possessed the object. Children and adults sided with the character that 
needed the object to prevent harm, providing evidence that they are able to consider a 
character‘s need for an object even when this character is not currently in possession of 
the object. In the previous experiments the character that possessed the object was also the 
character that had a more pressing need for the object. As a result when adults (and 
children in the non-ownership condition) sided with this character, they might have done 
so because of the value that they placed on possessor‘s rights or because of the value that 
they placed on that character‘s reasons for needing the object.  
To further examine the flexibility of the ownership bias, Experiment 5 examined a 
different situation in which preventing harm requires ownership to be disregarded. This 
experiment examined a different type of situation–one in which ownership might need to 
be disregarded to prevent an owner from using his object in a destructive way.   
  




Chapter Eight:  Experiment 5 
 
 
Sometimes violating owners‘ rights is needed to prevent harm to others. It is also 
sometimes necessary to violate owners‘ rights when the owner is about to use their 
property in a harmful way. An example of such reasoning is offered early in Plato‘s 
Republic, when Socrates suggests that it would be wrong to return weapons to a ―man not 
in his right mind‖ (Plato, 1871). Presumably, the weapons should not be returned because 
the owner is likely to inflict harm with them. Although permission is typically required 
before taking an object that belongs to someone else, there are some situations where it is 
not necessary. For instance, if a person is walking down the street carrying a machete, a 
police officer can confiscate the machete even though the person is the rightful owner. 
Similarly, parents and teachers often have to take away a child‘s property to prevent them 
from harming their own property or to prevent them from harming another person. For 
instance, if a child is throwing their ball inside a classroom, a teacher may take the ball 
away from the child to prevent others from being injured. Experiment 5, examines 3- to 5-
year-olds‘ and adults‘ judgments about such situations.  
Children again watched scenarios where two characters each wanted to use the 
same object. One character (non-owner) currently possessed the object and refused to give 
it to the second character (owner of the object) because of the owner‘s plan to inflict harm 
with the object. If the ownership bias is rigid and inflexible, than one would expect 
children to once again side with the owner, despite the plans the owner has to inflict harm 
with the object. However, if the ownership bias is flexible, then one would expect children 
to once again override the ownership bias and reason more like the adults (by siding with 




the character that wants to keep the object away from the person wanting to inflict harm 
with it).  
An alternative explanation for why the children might side with the owner could 
also be that they could not consider the fact that if the owner obtains the object in dispute 
he will inflict harm with his object. To rule out this possibility, half of the participants in 
each age group received a control condition. In the control (non-ownership) condition, the 
character requesting the use of the object to inflict harm has no claim to the object (in this 
condition, he is not the owner of the object needed). Instead, a third character, a teacher, 
was the owner of the object and lets everyone use the object. Because the owner was not 
involved in the dispute in this condition, one would expect that children and adults would 
both side with the character that wanted the object to prevent the other character from 
inflicting harm with it.   
Method 
Subjects. Ninety-eight children were tested: 34 3-year-olds (age range = from 3 
years 0 months to 3 years 11 months; M = 3 years  6 months; 17 girls and 17 boys),  36 4-
year-olds (age range = from 4 years 0 months to 4 years 11 months; M = 4 years 3 months; 
18 girls and 18 boys), and 28 5-year-olds (age range = from 5 years 0 months to 5 years 11 
months; M = 5 years  5 months; 10 girls and 18 boys). Nine additional 3-year-olds were 
seen, but failed to answer the memory questions correctly (eight in non-ownership 
condition and one in the ownership condition). Two additional 3-year-olds were excluded 
for failure to participate, and four 4-year-olds (two in each condition) also failed to answer 
the memory questions correctly. All were excluded from further analysis.  




Forty-nine adults were tested (age range = from 18 years to 58 years, M = 22; 18 
females and 31 males). Adults were recruited and tested at a University of Waterloo 
campus student center.  
Materials and procedure.  Children were given the same screening task as in the 
previous experiments.  Immediately following the screening task, children watched two 
stories presented on a lap top computer. The stories were presented in PowerPoint using 
cartoon images of children and toys; different cartoon images were used for each story 
(see Appendices G & H for examples). In each slide, a boy and a girl character were 
positioned a few inches apart in the middle of the slide. A third character, the teacher was 
positioned in the bottom centre of the slide (centered between the two characters). An 
object (a baseball bat in story 1, a shovel in story 2) was beside one of the two characters 
(the current possessor). A cartoon depiction of a school with a view of the school‘s 
windows and the flowers used as landscaping was placed in the top centre of the slide. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the ownership condition or the non-
ownership condition. 
In the ownership condition, the two characters are at school. One character, the 
object‘s owner, wants to use the object in a destructive manner (to break the school‘s 
windows in story one, to steal the flowers from the school in story two), the other 
character (the current possessor of the owner‘s object) does not want the owner to use the 
object. Here is a sample story from this condition: 
Story one: This is a story about these two kids at school. This one is a 
boy and this one is a girl. And this is their teacher. And this is their 
school. What is this? It is a__(baseball bat): Well, the baseball bat  




belongs to the girl. It is the girl‘s baseball bat. Pre-question: Whose 
baseball bat is it? (girls). The girl wants to use the baseball bat 
because she wants to break the school‘s windows. But the boy does 
not want to give her the baseball bat because he does not like what 
she is going to do with it. I have some questions for you.  
 
In the non-ownership condition, children were given an almost identical story 
except they were told that the teacher was the owner of the object. Here is a sample story 
from this condition: 
This is a story about these two kids at school. This one is a boy and 
this one is a girl. And this is their teacher. And this is their school. 
What is this? It is a__(baseball bat): Well, the baseball bat belongs to 
the teacher but she lets everyone use it. Pre-question: Whose baseball 
bat is it? (teacher’s). The girl wants to use the baseball bat because 
she wants to break the school‘s windows. But the boy does not want 
to give her the baseball bat because he does not like what she is going 
to do with it. I have some questions for you.  
 
Immediately following the stories, children were asked three question (always in 
the same order).  
1) Test question. Should the boy give the baseball bat to the girl? 
2) Memory question. What does the girl/boy want to do with the baseball   
bat/shovel?  
3) Post-memory question. Whose baseball bat/shovel is it? 




Adults were given the same stories as the children with the same modifications 
mentioned in Experiment 4. Adults were randomly assigned to the ownership or non-
ownership conditions.  
Within each condition and age group, two factors were fully counterbalanced 
between subjects: (1) whether boy characters were on the right and girl characters were on 
the left in both stories, or the reverse; (2) whether the child with the need for the object 
was a boy in the first story and a girl in the second, or the reverse. 
Results 
 
Participants were scored 0 for choosing the current user of the object and 1 for 
choosing the other character who wanted the object. Participants could obtain a maximum 
score of 2 points (1 point per story).  
 A 2 (condition: ownership, control) X 4 (age: three, four, five, adult) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of condition, F(1,139) = 9.40, p < .01,  and a main effect of age, 
F(3,139) = 4.08, p < .01. However, there was no interaction between condition and age, 
F(3, 139) = 1.62, p =.19. As can be seen in Figure 6, participants were more likely to side 
with the wanter when this character was the owner than when this character did not own 
the object and this difference was more apparent at younger ages.  
 Although there was no interaction between condition and age, further analyses 
nonetheless examined whether scores (the number of times participants choose the wanter) 
varied by condition at each age group. There was no effect of condition in 5-year-olds 
(t(26) = 0.22, p = .83), or in adults (t(47) = 1.21, p = .23); however, scores did vary by 
condition for 3-year-olds (t(32) = 3.04, p = .01) and 4-year-olds (t(34) = 2.21, p = .03). 
That is, the number of times that the participant chose the wanter did not vary across 




condition for 5-year-olds or adults, but 3- and 4-year-olds chose the wanter more in the 
ownership than in the non-ownership condition.  
Additional analyses investigated whether participants chose the wanter more often 
than chance in each condition. In the ownership condition, 3- and 4-year-olds were no 
likelier than chance to choose the wanter (3-year-olds: t(19) = 1.37, p = .19; 4-year-olds: 
t(17) = 0.49, p = .63). However, they chose the wanter less often than would be expected 
by chance in the non-ownership condition (3-year-olds: t(13) = 3.23, p = .01; 4-year-olds: 
t(17) = 4.58, p = .01), with most choosing the user instead. Adults and 5-year-olds were 
less likely than chance to choose the wanter in both the ownership condition (5-year-olds: 
t(13) = 2.51, p = .03; adults: t(24) = 3.93, p < .01) and the non-ownership condition (5-




 In Experiment 5, I tested whether children would disregard owners‘ rights and 
judge that a non-owner is justified in excluding an owner from using his own object if the 
owner has harmful intentions. In both the ownership and non-ownership conditions, adults 
sided with the character (non-owner) that wanted to maintain possession of the object to 
prevent the wanter from using the object to inflict harm. This demonstrates that adult‘s 
place more value on the reason for the non-owners attempt to maintain possession of the 
object, and less value on the owner‘s right to use his object. Similarly, most children (in 
both conditions) sided with the character that wanted the object to prevent another 
character from using it in a harmful way. The character that wanted to keep the object 
from the wanter was also the character that was in possession of the object at the time of 




the dispute. Therefore, in addition to replicating the findings from Experiment 4 and 
determining that children can override the ownership bias when provided with a very 
compelling reason for the non-owner to be given the object, this study also provides 
evidence that children are able to judge that there are times when a possessor should be 
more entitled to the object than the owner.  
Although children and adults sided with the character that sought to prevent the 
wanter from inflicting harm with the object and they did so regardless of condition, 3- and 
4-year-olds appeared to be influenced by the presence of an owner in the dispute. When 
the character that had intentions of causing harm with an object (wanter) was also the 
owner (ownership condition), 3- and 4-year-olds more often sided with the wanter. 
However, their scores did not depart from chance in the ownership condition. Thus, it 
appears that 3-year-olds and 4-year olds were less able to disregard ownership. In contrast, 
5-year-olds and adults were less likely than chance to choose the wanter in both the 
ownership and non-ownership conditions. 
The findings from this experiment provide additional evidence that there are times 
when children value ownership rights less than other factors. This study also further 
demonstrates that children`s ownership bias is flexible and can be overcome when there 
are compelling reasons to do so.  
  




Chapter Nine: General Discussion and Future Directions 
 
 
Five experiments investigated preschoolers‘ and adults‘ ownership reasoning 
during property disputes in which they are not directly involved. In each of the 
experiments children and adults observed two characters arguing over the use of an object 
and were then asked to make property entitlement decisions. One character (non-owner) 
always had a valid reason for wanting the object, while the other character (wanter) either 
wanted to use the object, or objected to the non-owner‘s use of the object. In these 
experiments, ownership rights were in direct opposition to accepted social conventions. 
Despite the fact that the owner has rights to his object in each of the experiments, it would 
be considered socially acceptable to allow the non-owner temporary access to the object. 
In Experiment 1, children and adults were asked to judge which of two characters 
should be entitled to the object in dispute. Participants could have chosen either the 
character that possessed the object and had a valid reason for wanting to maintain 
possession (that character needed the object to complete a birthday card) or the other 
character that wanted the object, but did not indicate a reason (wanter). In Experiments 2A 
and 2B, participants were faced with a property entitlement dispute similar to that in 
Experiment 1. This time, however, it was made clearer that the wanter did not have any 
reason, stated or implied, for needing the object other than just protesting the non-owner‘s 
use of the object.  
When neither of the characters involved in the dispute owned the object (non-
ownership condition), both children and adults sided with the character that possessed the 
object and had a valid reason for continued use of the object. However, in the ownership 
condition, in which the wanter actually owned the object, children and adults differed in 




their judgments. Adults were not swayed by the presence of the owner in the dispute and 
did not appear to value the owner‘s rights to his object. The adults continued to judge that 
the character with a valid need for the object was entitled to continued use. In contrast, 
children at all ages were strongly influenced by the presence of the owner in the dispute.  
In Experiment 3, participants were faced with a property entitlement dispute 
similar to that in Experiment 1 and 2. This time, however, the disputes were between two 
adult characters and the dispute was over objects of greater monetary value to adults. The 
results of Experiment 3 were similar to those of Experiments 1 and 2. Adults did not 
appear to strongly value
3
 the owner‘s rights to his object. Yet, children at all ages were 
once again strongly influenced by the presence of the owner in the dispute. Children were 
biased towards judging that the owner was more entitled to the object, despite the non-
owner‘s more valid reason for using the object, and despite the fact that it would not be 
considered socially acceptable to take the object back before then non-owner was finished 
using it. Children supported the owner‘s rights in these disputes and did not alter their 
judgments despite the change in age of the characters involved in the dispute and despite 
the change in objects being fought over. These findings were expected since children 
strongly value owner‘s rights to the exclusion of all other factors.  
The results of these studies demonstrate that children place more importance 
(value) ownership much more strongly than do adults and are consistent with Ross‘s 
(1996) study. Unlike children, adults often value other factors such as current possession 
and need. Adults are sensitive to context, evaluating more factors than children evaluate in 
reaching their decisions about who should possess objects.  




The findings from these studies also contradict a recent theory by Blake and Harris 
(2011) suggesting that children are not born with an understanding of ownership, but 
instead rely on visual and verbal information to construct knowledge about the 
relationship between people and objects. Blake and Harris (2011) propose that one of the 
major difficulties young children face when developing a mature concept of ownership is 
the contradiction between verbal and visual ownership information. This contradiction can 
often lead to difficulties in learning about ownership. For instance, if children observe one 
character with an object, but are verbally told that a second character is the true owner of 
the object, they may have difficulty overriding their initial visual information and 
accepting that the second character is the actual owner. The authors suggest that this 
difficulty in overriding initial visual information could be behind young children‘s 
difficulty with gift-giving scenarios. Presumably, it is not until age five that children can 
overcome their initial visual information that the first possessor owns the object and 
accept the verbal information that the first possessor has given the object to the second-
possessor as a gift (and therefore the second possessor now owns the object) (Blake and 
Harris (2009).  
However, the findings from my Experiments 1 to 3 contradict this view. In these 
experiments children visually observed an object with a possessor and were verbally told 
that the object belonged to a second character that was never seen physically possessing 
the object. Children as young as three years of age were able to not only correctly identify 
the character that did not physically possess the object as the owner, but they were also 
able to make judgments about what this owner‘s rights were.  
 




Right of Exclusion 
One of the goals of this thesis was to determine whether children understand that 
owners have the right to exclude others from their property. As mentioned in the 
introduction, almost no studies have addressed children‘s understanding of ownership 
using a methodology that would eliminate the influence of children‘s self-interest on the 
results. However, a recent study by Kim and Kalish (2009) did take steps to eliminate this 
problem, using a third party methodology. Children and adults reasoned about scenarios in 
which an owner and a non-owner disagreed about whether certain actions could be taken 
with an object. For example, in one story an owner and a non-owner disagreed about 
whether to allow a third party to use an object. Children were asked to decide who gets to 
make the decision (whether to lend the object or not). Children aged four and five often 
sided with the owner, but did so less often than adults.  Because children sided with the 
owner less often than adults, the authors suggest that children have less appreciation for 
ownership rights than adults. However, the Kim and Kalish (2009) studies did not include 
a control condition and therefore, it is difficult to determine if children sided less often 
with the owner because they have less appreciation of the owners rights or simply because 
they did not agree with the outcome of the owner‘s actions (i.e., if the owner wanted the 
object to re-categorize the object, such as using a hat as a purse). Interestingly, if the 
children ever did made a judgment that an action could be performed, they only granted 
this right to the owner and not to the non-owner. This suggests then that the objections had 
more to do with the action than having less appreciation for owner‘s rights.  
While the Kim and Kalish (2009) studies suggest that children aged four and five 
may have less appreciation for ownership rights than older children, my studies  provide 




evidence that  children as young as 3-years-old understand and value the right of 
exclusion. By judging that the owner was more entitled to his object when the non-owner 
had a valid reason for wanting to use the object (Experiments 1 and 3), or when the owner 
had no reason for using the object except not wanting the other character to use it 
(Experiment 2), children clearly indicate that they recognize that the owner has the right to 
exclude a non-owner from using an object, thereby demonstrating that they value this right 
over other principles of entitlement.  
Ownership bias or another explanation?  
There could be interpretations of why children would side with the owner that do 
not hinge on an ownership bias. Perhaps children chose the owner simply because (a) they 
are unable to consider a character‘s need for an object when making allocation decisions, 
or (b) children have a strong belief in turn-taking and simply judge that whichever 
character has not  had a turn with the object should be given a turn. Therefore, they may 
have chosen the owner simply because they felt he should be given a turn with the object.  
The non-ownership condition in Experiments 1 and 2 helped to rule out both of 
these possibilities. First, when no owner was present, children did consider the character‘s 
need for an object and judged that this character should be entitled to the use of the object. 
Likewise, the non-ownership condition ruled out the possibility that children chose the 
owner because they felt he should get a turn with the object. If children did have a 
tendency to side with a character who had not yet had a turn with an object, then in the 
non-ownership condition, they should still have chosen the wanter. The wanter did not 
currently possess the object and had not yet had a turn with the object in all three 
experiments; however children did not side with this character. In the non-ownership 




condition children judged that the character currently possessing the object should be 
entitled to continued use of the object, indicating that they were not concerned with nor 
were they relying on the concept of turn-taking.  
An additional possibility is that children are unable to keep two factors in mind 
when making allocation decisions, and did not fully consider both the possession rights 
and ownership rights when making their allocation decisions. However, there is evidence 
that children can consider simultaneous factors with a high degree of sophistication 
(Cassidy, Chue & Dahlsgaard, 1997). Even if it were true that children could not consider 
multiple factors, this still would not explain why children focused on the owner‘s rights 
rather than the possessor‘s rights. After all, possession is visible whereas ownership is 
abstract. If children could not keep two factors in mind, it would seem more plausible that 
they would keep the visible factor in mind and side with the possessor. However, this was 
not the case. Children judged that the owner should be entitled to the use of the object, 
indicating an ownership bias.  
Flexibility of Ownership Bias  
Beyond investigating whether children have an ownership bias, I was interested in 
determining whether the bias is rigid and difficult to override, or whether the bias is 
flexible and can be overridden when children are provided with compelling reasons to do 
so. Therefore, in Experiment 4, participants were presented with stories in which the non-
owner had a more compelling reason for using the object than in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. 
Here, the non-owner wanted to use the object to prevent harm to an animal, which placed 
the owner‘s right to his property against the animal‘s right to be safe and free from harm. 
In Experiment 5, I further explored the flexibility of the ownership bias and sought to 




determine whether participants could disregard an owner‘s rights to his object when the 
owner wanted to use his object in a harmful way (i.e., to destroy property). Experiment 5 
was unique in that it placed an owner‘s right to use his property in direct conflict with 
another character‘s altruistic desire to protect someone else‘s right not to have his property 
damaged.  
If children have a rigid ownership bias that is difficult to override, they would have 
judged that the owner (wanter) was entitled to the object in dispute, despite the non-
owners unquestionable need for the object. However, in Experiment 4, both adults and 
children aged four and older sided against the wanter and did so regardless of whether the 
wanter was the owner. Three-year-olds, on the other hand, were more likely to side with 
the wanter when this character was the owner, but their responses did not depart from 
chance in either condition. In other words, 3-year-olds did not rigidly uphold owner‘s 
rights, but they were influenced by the presence of the owner nonetheless.  
Similarly, in Experiment 5, adults and 5-year-olds sided against the wanter 
regardless of whether the wanter was the owner or not. However, 3- and 4-year-olds were 
more likely to side with the wanter when this character was the owner, but their responses 
did not depart from chance in the ownership condition. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that children can disregard the ownership bias, when provided with very 
compelling reasons to do so.  
Why do Children Disregard an Owners’ Right When Doing So Prevents Harm? 
 
 Although we have evidence that children value ownership much more strongly 
than adults, Experiments 4 and 5, provide evidence that there are factors that children 
value even more than an owner‘s right to his property, such as freedom from harm. These 




findings also suggest developmental changes in judgments about whether it is acceptable 
to disregard ownership rights to prevent harm. Older children (and adults) are able to 
disregard ownership rights when they are provided with compelling enough reasons to do 
so, however, younger children are more influenced by the presence of the owner in the 
dispute and often uphold owner‘s rights to the exclusion of all other factors.  
A further question remains:  Why do older children reason like adults and judge 
that ownership should be disregarded to prevent harm, but do not hold the adult view that 
there are some situations where a non-owner should be entitled to use an object even when 
an owner objects? One possibility is that children are better able to set aside owners‘ 
rights in situations where it is necessary to prevent harm from occurring because of a 
general capacity to reason about how to minimize bad outcomes. Previous studies 
investigating children‘s moral development found that, like adults, most children by 3- to 
4-years of age can generate utilitarian judgments (Pellizzoni, & Surian, 2010). That is, 
they believe that in each situation, there are definite rules and expectations as to what a 
person should do to achieve the best outcome and to benefit the greatest number of people. 
Presumably, in Experiments 3 and 4, older children were able to disregard the ownership 
bias in the interest of minimizing the bad outcome that would occur if the owners‘ rights 
were not violated (i.e., the animal would be harmed in Experiment 4 and property 
damaged would occur in Experiment 5). However, the younger children had difficulty 
disregarding owner‘s rights when doing so was necessary to minimize bad outcomes.    
 Another possibility is that children have learned that some moral and rule 
violations are considered worse than others. Thus, in Experiments 4 and 5 children may be 
aware that it is wrong to disregard an owner‘s rights, but may feel that the violation of 




other rights (such as the right to be free from harm in Experiment 4 and the right to not 
have property damaged in Experiment 5) are much more serious. Previous studies have 
found that young children are capable of evaluating moral rules based on their concepts of 
rights, justice, and the welfare of others (Tisak & Turiel, 1984) and to judge that rule 
violations that inflict harm are more wrong than others. 
Origins of the Ownership Bias 
 
Another goal of my studies was to determine whether children and adults differ in 
their reasoning about ownership. If children learn about ownership directly from adult 
input, then their reasoning should mirror that of the adults and they should place lower 
value on owners‘ rights. If their reasoning differs from that of the adults, this would 
suggest that children may not be acquiring their ownership understanding from the adults 
in their environment. This thesis demonstrates not only that children and adults differ in 
their ownership reasoning, but that the children value ownership much more strongly than 
the adults. It is unclear how children could ―learn‖ to appreciate and value ownership 
rights when my studies demonstrate that the adults do not often support the rights of 
owners.   
An important question is whether the ownership bias is somehow conveyed in 
culture, or whether it emerges naturally in young children. I have three reasons to believe 
that children do not learn about ownership directly from environmental input. First, 
children show a very early onset of ownership understanding before most parents have 
spent any time attempting to teach their children about ownership. For instance, beginning 
at age two children demonstrate a remarkable understanding of ownership (Eisenberg-




Berg, Haake, Hand, & Sadalla, 1979, 1981; Fasiq, 2000; Friedman & Neary, 2008; Neary, 
Friedman & Burnstein, 2009; Ross, 1996).  
Second, there is little evidence suggesting that parents teach their children why 
someone is an owner of an object, how that person acquired ownership, or why ownership 
is important. When parents intervene in property issues they most often focus on teaching 
their children to not play with dangerous or breakable objects and instruct their children to 
avoid throwing objects (Dunn & Munn, 1987). There is also evidence that parents often 
teach their children that they should take turns and share objects, suggesting to children 
that parents do not value the rights of owners, but instead value more co-operative 
behaviour (Lollis, Van Engen, Nowack, & Ross, 1999; Ross, 1996). Yet, somehow 
children still demonstrate that they strongly value the rights of owners, and uphold 
owners‘ rights during property disputes.   
Third, parental intervention does not seem to affect children‘s ownership 
behaviour. In Ross‘s (1996) study, when parents intervened in young children‘s property 
entitlement disputes and suggested that the children should share the object in dispute or 
find something else to play with, children managed to strongly uphold these rights 
regardless of what parents were instructing. It is hard to explain how young children could 
come to value the rights of owners so strongly, and so early in development, when 
evidence suggests that parents are actually instructing their children to consider factors 
other than ownership in property entitlement disputes.   
Since it is unlikely that children learn about ownership directly from parental 
input, they must have some other source for their knowledge about ownership. One 
possibility is that children still learn about ownership from their parents, but not from their 




parents‘ judgments during property disputes. Instead, children might learn about 
ownership indirectly from parent‘s ownership interactions with other adults. However, this 
is doubtful for two reasons. First, the findings from Experiment 3 suggest that in property 
disputes between adults, adults would not show strong support for owners‘ rights. Second, 
adult property disputes are quite rare. So, it is unlikely that such young children would be 
present during adult property disputes or that they would be able to successfully process 
the disputes and the abstract rules of ownership from the adult behaviours. But, when 
adults are engaged in an argument over property, these disputes are usually disputes over 
objects that neither adult owns. For instance, adults disagree over such things as who has 
the right to a parking stall, or who was sitting in a chair first. In these situations, children 
would not be able to learn about ownership rules from these disputes as they are not 
unique to owned objects.  
A second possibility is that children learn about ownership from peer interactions. 
However, this appears doubtful. If very young children did not know about ownership, 
then their peers would be equally unlikely to know much about ownership and it would be 
hard to see how they could learn from their peers to value ownership. Furthermore, most 
property disputes with peers occur in daycares, preschools, and playgroups (Tulviste & 
Koor, 2005). Often, in these situations, neither peer owns the objects in dispute and it 
seems unlikely that children could learn about the principles of ownership. It is more 
likely that children learn about the principles of possession rights during peer interactions.  
and therefore the disputes do not involve ownership rights, but involve possession rights 
instead. 




A third possibility is that children learn about ownership from the types of 
utterances parents make during property disputes between siblings or peers. We know that 
during these types of disputes, parents often intervene to instruct their children to share. 
Perhaps parents utter statements such as; ―let your brother have a turn‖ to the owner. This 
type of utterance many send the message to children that the owner has the right to decide 
and the parents are simply instructing children that they should allow their sibling to have 
a turn.  However, similar utterances likely occur in situations where no owner is present. 
For example, children fighting over a swing at a park are likely to receive the same 
statement from their parents (i.e., ―let your brother have a turn on the swing‖). Again, this 
type of utterance would not be unique to ownership situations, so when used in ownership 
situations, it would not provide children with a clear message. 
A fourth possibility is that children have a natural ―ownership‖ sense–an intuitive 
belief about ownership that allows them  to quickly make judgments and decisions about 
ownership, even in the absence of any experience within the specific ownership context 
and without explicitly reasoning about the issue. This ownership sense could derive from 
an innate concept of ―ownership‖ combined with early experiences with objects. The 
ability to reflect and reason about ownership may develop later in life. This could explain 
why initially children strongly value ownership and later on in development they appear to 
value other factors over ownership. 
What are Parents Doing?  
 
 If parents are not teaching their children to strongly value the rights of owners, 
than what are parents teaching?  My argument is that children initially have a very strong 
sense of what is right and wrong in issues surrounding ownership, and that they 




effortlessly judge that an owner should be entitled to his object in most property 
entitlement disputes. However, I suspect that at some point in development, children learn 
from parents that there are some situations when it would be appropriate and expected to 
override their rigid beliefs. 
It is widely recognized that parents foster social development in children (Grusec 
& Kuczynski, 1977; Piaget, 1932; Youniss, 1980).  Typically children are influenced by 
direct social experiences and learn how to interact with others based on the outcomes of 
specific interactions with others. They also are often influenced by cultural values and 
norms (Tomasello, 2009).  Common social norms conveyed by parents include direction 
to be nice, to be helpful, to not lie, and to share your toys (Furby, 1978; Tomasello, 2009). 
Early in development, children have a lot of experience with disputes over toys (Chen, 
Fein, Killen, & Tam, 2001) and when parents intervene in the disputes they instruct their 
children to share or to find another toy to play with (Lollis, et al, 1999;Ross, 1996). This 
type of instruction should be teaching children that despite the owner having rights to his 
object, there are other factors to consider, such as the fact that it is considered socially 
acceptable to share with others. Presumably, with development, children learn when it 
would be appropriate to take information into account other than ownership. Thus, 
children do not appear to need instruction on the concept of ownership; instead, they need 
to learn the specific situations where it would be acceptable to disregard an owner‘s rights. 
That is, adults involved in a child‘s life (parents, teachers, and babysitters) do not have to 
teach children about ownership and the rights of owners; instead, they need to teach 
children how to be flexible in their intuitions about ownership.  




If this view is correct, then children‘s frequent disputes over objects cannot result 
from children lacking an appreciation of ownership. Disputes might instead occur because 
non-owners have difficulty overcoming their desires for others‘ property, and because 
owners fail to appreciate their social obligation to share. The evidence that even school-
age children have an ownership bias supports this view. It is clear that children are 
resistant to adult input suggesting that an owner should share their object, at least in non-
emergency situations. 
Conclusion 
 Understanding ownership rights is an important aspect of child development given 
that it is crucial for socially appropriate behavior. Despite the intuitive view that children 
learn about ownership from parental input, this thesis highlights the fact that children have 
their own ideas about ownership and value ownership much more strongly than adults do. 
These studies not only show that adults and children differ in their property entitlement 
reasoning, but they are also the first stuides of their kind to provide evidence that children 
as young as 3-years-old understand the rights of owners, especially the right to exclude. 
 These findings are really quite remarkable. There are many factors suggesting that 
children should know little about ownership. First, learning about ownership rights should 
be difficult. Ownership rights are invisible and abstract. In looking at an object, a child 
cannot see whether it is owned, who owns it, or what privileges are associated with 
owning the object–all they can see is who is in possession of the object. It is difficult to 
see how children could learn about these ownership rights, in the same way as it is 
difficult to see how children learn about other abstract concepts, such as other people‘s 
mental states.  




Second, young children are often faced with situations where owners‘ rights are 
disregarded or downplayed. Despite the fact that owners should be entitled to use their 
property, and to decide whether others are permitted to use their property, parents 
frequently forbid children from playing with their own toys, forbid children from using 
their toys in certain ways, confiscate their toys, and insist that they share their toys with 
others (Ross, 1996). It is difficult to see how children could come to appreciate ownership 
rights, when they should instead view these rights as easily overridden by competing 
principles of entitlement. Hence, there are several reasons to believe that young children 
should have a limited appreciation of ownership, gaining this understanding only in later 
years. And yet, this thesis provides evidence that children value ownership more strongly 
than adults do and that they do so from very early in their development. 
Contribution to Research  
The present investigation makes a number of novel contributions to the study of 
ownership understanding in young children. First, despite the intuitive view that children 
place little value on ownership and as a result enter into frequent property disputes, these 
studies are the first to provide experimental evidence that children do value ownership and 
do so from a very young age. Second, these studies also provide compelling evidence not 
only that children value ownership, but that they value ownership much more strongly 
than adults. Third, these studies also contribute to our understanding of young children‘s 
reasoning about ownership by providing us with evidence that, despite the fact that they 
strongly value ownership, there are some situations where they are aware that other factors 
should be valued above ownership. Fourth, as mentioned above, these studies are the first 




to demonstrate that not only do children value ownership, but they also understand and 
strongly value the owner‘s right of exclusion.  
Future Directions 
The results of the studies that make up the present investigation highlight the very 
surprising fact that despite the intuitive view that young children have little appreciation 
of ownership, this is actually not the case. Children strongly value ownership and do so at 
a young age. Although in this thesis it has been argued that children do not acquire their 
appreciation of ownership directly from parental input, there is a need for further studies 
directed at determining what exactly parents are telling their young children about 
ownership and what other sources might be influential. In particular, parental ownership 
utterances should be explored. Further studies should investigate if parents explicitly state 
what their children are entitled to or forbidden from doing with an object, and, if so, what 
specific property rules they cite. If, as I suspect, it is discovered that parents do not 
provide their children with these types of instructions within their ownership utterances, 
we would have further evidence supporting the findings from my thesis that children 
cannot be acquiring their strong support of ownership rights directly from parental/adult 
input.  
This would support two conclusions. First, rather than learning about ownership from 
parental input, children may come to appreciate owner‘s rights but from early sibling 
interactions. As mentioned previously, because children value ownership at such a young 
age, I have argued that they are not learning this from their interactions with siblings or 
peers. One way to rule out this possibility would be to conduct studies investigating 
whether children with siblings show an earlier and increased understanding of ownership 




as compared with only children. One method of studying the problem would be to record 
sibling/peer interactions in ownership situations. If children with siblings demonstrate an 
increased understanding of ownership, then perhaps there would be something in the early 
peer interactions that contribute to children‘s acquiring a strong ownership value. 
However, if children with and without siblings value ownership rights equally strongly, 
then this would further support the hypothesis that children are not learning about 
ownership. Second, such findings could provide further evidence in support of the view 
that ownership could be innate. It would provide us with one more piece of evidence 
suggesting that children do not actually need to be taught about ownership, but rather that 
it is something that they may be born with and may have a built-in understanding for 
ownership concepts.  
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In Experiment 2 there were two questions asked per story. Eighty percent of participants 
showed the same pattern of response in their answers for both questions. 
2
In Experiment 3 (but no other experiments) there appeared to be item effects. There was a 
tendency for adults—but not for children—to respond differently to the two stories.  Of 
the 22 adults, 13 were consistent across the two stories:  5 sided with the owner for both 
stories, and 8 sided with the non-owner for both stories. Of the remaining 9 adults, all 
chose the owner for the shovel story and the non-owner for the cell phone story (which 
was just significant by a sign test, p < .01). This aligns with the conclusion that the adults 
are not consistent in their selection, and certainly do not choose the owner all the time.    
3
When I say value in this sense I mean more strongly weigh this factor (ownership) above 
other factors (i.e., current possession and need). 
  




Appendix A. Example of cartoon depiction of property dispute as presented to adults in 


















Appendix B. Example of cartoon depiction of property dispute as presented to adults in 





































Appendix C. Example of cartoon depiction of property dispute as presented to 




























Appendix D. Example of cartoon depiction of property dispute as presented to participants 






























Appendix E. Example of cartoon depiction of property dispute as presented to participants 
















Appendix F. Example of cartoon depiction of property dispute as presented to participants 














Appendix G. Example of cartoon depiction of property dispute as presented to participants 












Appendix H. Example of cartoon depiction of property dispute as presented to participants 















Figure 1. Experiment 1:  Mean number of times that the participants chose the  
 wanter. 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 2:  Mean number of times that the participants chose the  
 wanter. 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 2B:  Mean number of times that the participants chose the  
 wanter. 
 
Figure 4. Experiment 3:  Mean number of times that the participants chose the  
 wanter. 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 4:  Mean number of times that the participants chose the  
 wanter. 
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